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AN ADMINISTRATIVE STOPGAP FOR MIGRANTS FROM
THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE
Collin Schueler*

From 2011–2014, the United States Department of Homeland Security recorded an
extraordinary increase in the number of unaccompanied children arriving at the
southern border from Central America’s “Northern Triangle”—the area made up of
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In fact, in fiscal year 2014, United
States Customs and Border Protection apprehended over 50,000 unaccompanied
children from the Northern Triangle. That is thirteen times more than just three
years earlier.
This Article examines the intersecting humanitarian and legal crises facing these
children and offers an administrative solution to the problem. The children are
fleeing a genuine humanitarian crisis—a region overrun by violent gangs that
regularly target young people for recruitment. Once in the United States, these children face their own legal crisis. Indeed, they must confront numerous procedural
and substantive hurdles, trying to avoid removal. As a result, many of the children
are at serious risk of being deported and subsequently killed by the very gangs that
they fled. Given this situation, the Article argues that President Obama’s administration should provide temporary humanitarian protection to these migrants by
exercising its congressionally delegated power to designate El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras as new “temporary protected status” countries. Under this proposal,
the United States would provide a temporary safe haven to nationals of these three
countries until the horrific gang violence in the Northern Triangle subsides.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: GANG VIOLENCE IN THE
NORTHERN TRIANGLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Origins and History of the Gangs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Modern Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE LEGAL CRISIS: BARRIERS TO OBTAINING RELIEF
FROM REMOVAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Arriving at the Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Procedural Hurdles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

214
220
220
226
231
232
233

*
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. I would
first like to thank Scott Bauries for numerous thoughtful discussions throughout the writing
process. I am also grateful to Albertina Antognini, James Donovan, Joshua Douglas, Anthony
Farley, Brian Frye, Jane Grise, Michael Healy, Nicole Huberfeld, Mark Kightlinger, Cortney
Lollar, Melynda Price, and Andrew Woods for their helpful comments. I would also like to
thank Faculty Services Librarian Franklin Runge for his advice and research assistance.
Thanks also to participants at the University of Kentucky College of Law workshop in
October 2014 and the Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law
conference in September 2014.

213

214

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 49:1

C. Substanative Hurdles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Asylum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Other Forms of Relief from Removal . . . . . . . .
III. AN ADMINISTRATION SOLUTION TO THE INTERSECTING
CRISES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Temporary Protected Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Designating the Northern Triangle Countries . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

237
238
256
260
262
264
271

INTRODUCTION
When Benito Zaldı́var was a young boy in El Salvador, his parents
left him in his grandparents’ care, and they came to work in the
United States.1 Before Benito was even a teenager, members of the
18th Street Gang (M-18), an extremely violent gang with American
roots,2 started trying to recruit Benito into their ranks. The gang
members repeatedly threatened to kill Benito and his grandparents
if he did not join. Nevertheless, Benito consistently rebuffed the
gang’s advances.
However, after Benito’s grandmother passed away, he believed
that he could no longer safely resist the gang. Therefore, when he
was just fifteen years old, Benito fled El Salvador and traveled to the
United States with the hope of reuniting with his parents. As Benito
tried to cross into the United States, border patrol agents stopped
him. Benito quickly applied for asylum, arguing that if he was sent
back to El Salvador, members of M-18 would kill him for refusing to
join their gang.3 Immigration officials allowed Benito to join his
parents in Missouri while his asylum case moved through the legal
system.
Benito started going to high school and began to feel safe for the
first time in his life. That feeling was short-lived, however, because
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative body that adjudicates immigration cases,4 ultimately denied his
asylum application and ordered him removed from the United
States. The government then deported Benito back to El Salvador.
1.
Benito’s story comes from Julia Preston, Losing Asylum, Then His Life, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2010, at A16. His story is also recounted in DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 148–49 (2012).
2.
See infra Part I (discussing M-18’s roots in the United States).
3.
See Preston, supra note 1 (“He applied for asylum, saying that if he returned to El
Salvador, the Mara-18 would exact revenge for his refusal to join.”).
4.
See Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
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Benito was murdered eight weeks later. According to witnesses,
he was riding his bicycle through the Salvadoran coastal town of La
Libertad when a white van pulled alongside him and a M-18 gang
member shot him in the face. Benito’s father was still living in Missouri when a family member informed him that his son had been
killed. The family member begged Benito’s father not to return to
El Salvador for Benito’s funeral due to the ongoing violence. Reluctantly, Benito’s father agreed. “It left me with an empty place,”
Benito’s father later recalled; “But she said the gangs could blow
me away, too.”5
Benito’s tragic story illustrates the intersecting humanitarian and
legal crises facing so many people from Central America. The humanitarian crisis is staggering. Over the past decade, more than
140,000 homicides were recorded in Central America’s “Northern
Triangle”—the area made up of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.6 And the problem is only getting worse.7 A recent United
Nations (U.N.) report shows that the Northern Triangle is now
among the most violent regions in the world.8 In Honduras, the
homicide rate has more than doubled since 2006, and the country
now has the highest murder rate on earth.9 In El Salvador, the
homicide rate has been increasing since mid-2013, and it just
reached its highest level in years.10 And in Guatemala, which has
the fifth highest homicide rate in the world, murders are also on
the rise.11
Organized gangs like M-18 are responsible for much of the violence.12 As the U.N. has said, “Central America’s gang-related
5.
6.

Preston, supra note 1.
See ASSESSMENT CAPACITIES PROJECT, OTHER SITUATIONS OF VIOLENCE IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA: INVISIBLE BORDERS, VICIOUS SPIRALS, AND THE
NORMALISATION OF TERROR 2 (2014). This report notes that (1) “the rate of underreporting is
very high throughout the region,” and (2) “this number [does not] include the numerous
people who go missing and whose bodies are later found.” Id. at 4–5. Therefore, the actual
number of homicides in the Northern Triangle is almost certainly much higher.
7.
In 2012, Michael Shifter wrote in a Council on Foreign Relations report that “Central America is increasingly beset by spreading criminal violence.” MICHAEL SHIFTER, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNTERING CRIMINAL VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 3 (2012). More
recent reports, which are discussed below, show that Shifter’s statement remains true as violence in the region continues to grow. See, e.g., infra notes 8–18.
8.
See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE 2013: TRENDS, CONTEXTS, DATA 23–24, 33 (2013) [hereinafter U.N. HOMICIDE REPORT].
9.
See id. at 126.
10. See Elisabeth Malkin, El Salvador Cracks Down on Crime, but Gangs Remain, N.Y. TIMES,
(Aug. 11, 2105), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/world/americas/el-salvador-cracksdown-on-crime-but-gangs-remain-unbowed.html.
11. See U.N. HOMICIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126.
12. See SHIFTER, supra note 7, at 6 (“Soaring homicide rates and widespread perceptions
of insecurity are also largely due to the proliferation of local gangs.”).
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homicides have been driving the extremely high levels of homicide
in the sub-region.”13 The gangs are also responsible for numerous
other crimes, including drug trafficking, violent street crime, weapons smuggling, robbery, extortion, human trafficking, sexual
assaults, and kidnapping.14 This gang violence affects all segments
of the Northern Triangle’s population.15
That said, the chief victims of gang violence are young people,
particularly those who, like Benito, refuse to join the gangs.16 Indeed, the gangs regularly threaten, beat, rape, kidnap, and kill
youth who oppose recruitment.17 A senior U.N. official said:
[G]angs are really operating with significant impunity and
targeting children at a younger and younger age. Recently,
there was a very public massacre and dismemberment of children as young as seven who had refused to join the gang. . . .
It’s a humanitarian crisis in the region.18
This humanitarian crisis has prompted a growing number of children to flee the Northern Triangle.19 Since October 2011, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has recorded an extraordinary increase in the number of unaccompanied children
arriving at the southern border from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
13. U.N. HOMICIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 45; see also id. at 43 (indicating that, in
Central America, the number of homicides linked to gangs and organized criminal groups is
significant and increasing); id. at 18 (“[H]omicides in the Americas are often connected to
organized crime or gang activity.”).
14. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34112, GANGS IN CENTRAL
AMERICA 4–5 (2014); SHIFTER, supra note 7, at 6.
15. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 250 (BIA 2014) (saying that, in the context of
Central America, “victims of gang violence come from all segments of society”) (citation
omitted).
16. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS RELATING
TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS 4 (2010) [hereinafter UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE] (recognizing, in the context of Central America, that “[t]he primary victims of youth-gang related
violence are other young people,” including individuals who refuse recruitment); LAURA
PEDRAZA FARIÑA ET AL., NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL
SALVADOR 88–92 (Harvard Univ. Press 2010) (discussing how young people who refuse to
join the gangs are among the most vulnerable people in Central America).
17. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 72–77, 89–92.
18. Brian Resnick, Why 90,000 Children Flooding Our Border is Not an Immigration Story,
NAT’L J. (June 16, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/2014/06/16/why-90000-children-flooding-our-border-is-not-immigration-story.
19. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN ON THE RUN: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN LEAVING CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
26–27 (2014) [hereinafter UNHCR CHILDREN ON THE RUN REPORT] (surveying 404 unaccompanied or separated children from Mexico and the Northern Triangle and finding that many
were fleeing “violence in society,” including “gang-related harm”).
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Honduras.20 In fact, in fiscal year (FY) 2014,21 U.S. Customs and
Border Protection apprehended 51,705 unaccompanied children
from the Northern Triangle—thirteen times more than just three
years earlier.22
As a result of this influx, some government officials and members
of the media have started to acknowledge that these children are
fleeing a humanitarian crisis in their home countries. But what is
being overlooked is that these children now face their own legal
crisis here in the United States.
The children face numerous procedural hurdles in removal proceedings.23 Indeed, these proceedings can be very intimidating,
they are legally complex, and most children must attend their hearings without a lawyer.24 Therefore, many childrens’ immigration
cases have little chance of even getting off the ground.
Beyond these procedural hurdles, many children will also face
significant substantive hurdles while trying to avoid deportation.25 It
is true that the children may apply for asylum,26 the main form of
relief available to individuals fleeing humanitarian crises.27 But the
BIA has repeatedly rejected the two most common asylum claims
made by children fleeing gang recruitment—that they have been or
will be targeted back home (1) because of their membership in the
particular social group of youth who have been recruited by gangs
but refused to join,28 or (2) because of their anti-gang political
opinions.29 And while the children may apply for other forms of
relief from removal, such as protection under the Convention
Against Torture,30 visas for victims of human trafficking or other
crimes,31 or special immigrant juvenile status,32 these forms of relief
are relatively narrow and appear unlikely to protect large numbers
of people.33 Accordingly, many children are at serious risk of being
deported and facing the same fate as Benito Zaldı́var.
20. See Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) [hereinafter U.S. Customs and Border Protection Statistics].
21. FY 2014 ran from Oct. 1, 2013–Sept. 30, 2014. See id.
22. See id.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
27. See infra Part II.C.1.
28. See infra Part II.C.1.a.
29. See infra Part II.C.1.b.
30. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–208.18 (2015).
31. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 101(a)(15)(T)–(U) (2012).
32. See id. at § 101(a)(27)(J) (2012).
33. See infra Part II.C.2.
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Given this situation, President Obama’s administration should
provide temporary humanitarian protection to migrants from the
Northern Triangle. The administration should do this by exercising
its congressionally delegated power to designate El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as new “temporary protected status” (TPS)
countries.34 Under this proposal, the United States would provide a
temporary safe haven to nationals of these three countries until
conditions improve in the region.
To be sure, other scholars and commentators have also recently
called on the U.S. government to issue these fresh TPS designations.35 However, this is the first law review article to make the
34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b) (2012) (regarding TPS designations).
35. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Hoffman, The Border Children—They are Not Criminals and They
Need Counsel, IMMIGRATION PROF BLOG (July 21, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
immigration/2014/07/the-border-children-they-are-not-criminals-and-they-need-counsel-bygeoffrey-a-hoffman.html (“One possible way to deal with the issue is through temporary protected status (TPS), a form of humanitarian relief. TPS is a form of relief which Congress can
create for certain persons from specified countries which are facing upheavals. This status is
temporary but humanitarian in nature.”); Ira Kurzban, Opinion, Migrant Children Deserve Protected Status, MIAMI HERALD (July 15, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/
article1975667.html (“If we want to address this issue properly, address it at the source of the
violence in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. . . . At the same time, recognize these
helpless children for who they are—victims of violence—and grant them Temporary Protected Status.”); SHIFTER, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing the gang violence in the Northern
Triangle and then briefly arguing that “the Obama administration should grant Temporary
Protected Status (TPS) to Guatemalan migrants in the United States and extend it past 2013
for those from El Salvador and Honduras.”). The BIA also suggested that, while individuals
who flee gang violence in Central America may have a difficult time obtaining asylum, this
violence might justify new TPS designations. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 250–51
(BIA 2014).
Perhaps the most extensive and relevant work to date comes from American University
(AU). The Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at AU recently issued a comprehensive report regarding “the recent surge in migration to the United States by unaccompanied
children and families from the Northern Triangle countries.” Dennis Stinchcomb & Eric
Hershberg, Unaccompanied Migrant Children from Central America: Context, Causes, and Responses
1 (CLALS Working Paper Series No. 7, 2014). The report carefully examines the factors that
prompted so many young migrants to flee Central America and then considers the likelihood
that these individuals will be able to avoid deportation. See id. at 14–35. On the last page of
the report, Mr. Stinchcomb and Professor Hershberg write:
[T]here is an urgent need for reforms to the existing legal frameworks for determining the status of individuals and groups fleeing the lethal environment that now
prevails across much of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The expansion of
Temporary Protected Status to encompass recent arrivals from those three countries is
an appropriate first step.
Id. at 39. Soon after releasing the report, Professor Hershberg and Law Professor Jayesh
Rathod co-authored a brief commentary in Roll Call, also urging the United States to designate the Northern Triangle countries for TPS. See Eric Hershberg & Jayesh Rathod,
Commentary, The Case for Protected Status for Central American Migrants, ROLL CALL (Dec. 22,
2014), http://www.rollcall.com/news/the_case_for_protected_status_for_central_american_
migrants_commentary-238919-1.html (“Conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
more than justify a current TPS designation.”).
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comprehensive case for TPS as the proper response to the intersecting humanitarian and legal crises facing so many migrants from the
Northern Triangle.
TPS is the right answer to this complex problem because the
gang violence in the Northern Triangle constitutes an “ongoing
armed conflict,” one of the statutory criteria for designating foreign
states as TPS countries.36 At the very least, the violence perpetrated
by the gangs in the region represents other “extraordinary and temporary conditions,” preventing nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras from safely returning to their countries; this also justifies new TPS designations.37 Plus, designating the Northern
Triangle countries for TPS would be in line with prior designations.38 It would also be consistent with the purpose of the TPS
statute, which is to temporarily protect individuals who have fled
humanitarian crises in their home countries and are now in the
United States struggling to obtain relief from removal.39 Ultimately,
designating El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for TPS would
simply constitute an administrative stopgap, preventing the U.S.
government from deporting individuals back to the Northern Triangle until the horrific gang violence subsides. Given the
unprecedented humanitarian crisis engulfing the region, and the
fact that other forms of relief from removal are unavailable to many
of the fleeing migrants, this is the best solution.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by acknowledging that many of the unaccompanied children who recently arrived
at the southern border are fleeing a genuine humanitarian crisis—a
region overrun by violent gangs that regularly target young people
for recruitment. Part II examines the legal crisis that these children
now face in the United States—that is, the procedural and substantive hurdles the children must confront in trying to avoid
deportation. This Part concludes that, under our current immigration laws, many of these children are at serious risk of being
deported and subsequently killed. Part III offers an administrative
solution to this problem by calling on the Obama administration to
exercise its congressionally delegated power to designate El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as new TPS countries. This would
save countless lives by temporarily preventing the U.S. government
from deporting migrants back to the Northern Triangle.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A) (2012).
id. at 1254a(b)(1)(C) (2012).
infra notes 461–67 and accompanying text.
infra notes 468–73 and accompanying text.
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I. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: GANG VIOLENCE
IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE
This Part first examines the origins and history of the gangs in
the Northern Triangle by tracing these organizations back to their
roots in the United States. It then examines the modern situation in
the Northern Triangle, a region that the Associated Press recently
called “one of the most violent . . . on the planet.”40

A. The Origins and History of the Gangs
The 1980s were a time of great turmoil in the Northern Triangle.
Guatemala and El Salvador were both embroiled in devastating civil
wars that killed hundreds of thousands of people, and the Honduran economy was in shambles, with over seventy percent of the
population either unemployed or underemployed.41 These conflicts and economic challenges prompted more than one million
people to flee the Northern Triangle, with many coming to the
United States.42
A large percentage of those who arrived in the U.S. settled in Los
Angeles, where youth gangs already had a significant presence.43 In
part to protect themselves, many young Central Americans formed
their own gangs based on shared ethnicities, such as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang, which was established by Salvadoran youth.44
Others joined the Mexican-American gangs that were already in
place, such as the M-18.45
40. El Salvador’s ‘most violent month’: homicide rate hits record high in May, THE GUARDIAN
(June 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/03/el-salvador-homicide-killings-gangs.
41. See WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED ASYLUM: A RESOURCE GUIDE (2008) [hereinafter WOLA Resource Guide].
42. See id. (“[O]ver a million Salvadorans, about 20% of the population, fled the country, most to the United States. . . . [H]undreds of thousands of Guatemalans fled the country,
many of them arriving in the United States. . . . [M]any Honduran youth fled to the United
States, either on their own or with their families.”).
43. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 50–51.
44. See WOLA Resource Guide, supra note 41.
45. Id. In discussing the formation of MS-13 and M-18, the Washington Office on Latin
America includes this caveat: “While the origin of the Central American gangs is linked to
confrontations with Chicano gangs in Los Angeles, . . . no single factor is likely to cause gangs
to develop in a given community. It is likely that Chicano gangs were one influence among
many that led young people to associate with gangs, along with the lack of parental supervision, poor policing in communities, immigrants’ feelings of alienation, lack of opportunity,
and social exclusion.” Id.
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In 1992, riots erupted in Los Angeles after the acquittal of the
four police officers who fatally beat Rodney King.46 During the riots, between fifty and sixty people were killed, more than 2,000
people were injured, and hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
property was destroyed.47 In the wake of the destruction, the police
determined that the gangs caused most of the violence and property damage.48 Consequently, local, state, and federal officials
started a new anti-gang offensive.49 As part of this effort, prosecutors started charging youth gang members as adults, and California
enacted a series of strict anti-gang laws.50 These efforts greatly increased the number of incarcerated young Central Americans.51
Then, in 1996, Congress tightened the federal immigration laws
by passing two pieces of legislation—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)52 and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).53 These laws
did two things that resulted in the deportation of thousands of people, including many gang members, back to the Northern Triangle.
First, the laws expanded the grounds of removability for non-citizens, including lawful permanent residents.54 Most notably, the laws
vastly increased the list of crimes that qualified as an “aggravated
felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).55 Thus,
46. See TOM DIAZ, NO BOUNDARIES: TRANSNATIONAL LATINO GANGS AND AMERICAN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 94–98 (2009) (discussing the case and riots).
47. See id. at 98.
48. See Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June
2005, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-america-caribbean/2005-05-01/howstreet-gangs-took-central-america.
49. See DIAZ, supra note 46, at 99 (discussing these efforts).
50. See Arana, supra note 48.
51. See Margot Kniffin, Note, Balancing National Security and International Responsibility:
The Immigration System’s Legal Duty to Asylees Fleeing Gang Violence in Central America, 11 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 314, 317 (2011) (recognizing that California’s “ ‘get
tough’ approach to gangs,” including its passage of “the ‘three strikes’ law in 1996 . . . resulted in . . . [a] dramatic increase in the number of incarcerated Latino immigrants.”).
Margot Kniffin notes that “MS-13 and M-18 gang members were then centrally located within
the California prison system, providing an opportunity for the gangs to organize and gain
power.” Id.
52. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 [hereinafter AEDPA] (codified in various sections of the U.S.C.).
53. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA] (codified in various sections of the
U.S.C.). For a more detailed discussion of AEDPA and IIRIRA, see Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000).
54. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1844 (2007).
55. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2012)). Under the law, “[a]ny alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
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after AEDPA and IIRIRA, aggravated felonies included more than
just crimes like “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor;”56 indeed, the phrase was broadened to capture lower-level offenses,
such as “a crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment
[is] at least one year.”57 Congress also applied these changes retroactively, which meant that “even if an offense would not have
rendered a non-citizen removable at the time of its commission, the
non-citizen [was] subject to removal if the offense [was] a removable offense under the new law.”58
Second, the laws restricted the availability of discretionary forms
of relief from removal that had been available to deportable noncitizens.59 Prior to IIRIRA, immigration judges and the BIA had the
legal authority, pursuant to INA § 212(c), to balance equities in individual cases and decide whether to waive deportation.60 However,
IIRIRA eliminated this form of relief61 and replaced it with a much
more limited form of relief known as cancellation of removal.62
Taken together, these two legislative changes—expanding the
grounds of removability and limiting the available forms of relief
from removal—led to the deportation of tens of thousands of people back to the Northern Triangle.63 Estimates are that “[b]etween
1998 and 2005, the United States deported nearly 46,000 convicted
felons to Central America, in addition to another 160,000 illegal
immigrants. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras received more

56. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2012).
57. Id. at § 1101(a)(43)(F). Professor Chacón made this precise point, writing, “ ‘Aggravated felonies’ now include not only things like ‘murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor,’
but also a crime of violence or a theft offense ‘for which the term of imprisonment is at least
a year.’ ” Chacón, supra note 54, at 1844 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A), (F), (G)).
58. Chacón, supra note 54, at 1844 (citing AEDPA § 440(f); IIRIRA § 321(b)).
59. See id. at 1845 (“The new laws also eliminated many avenues of relief from removal
that formerly would have been available to non-citizens removable for criminal offenses.”).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988). Before 1996, this provision was found at INA § 212(c).
61. See Chacón, supra note 54, at 1845 (“[T]he 1996 law eliminated relief under the
former section 212(c).”).
62. The provisions regarding cancellation of removal can be found at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a)–(b) (2008). As Jennifer Chacón points out, “cancellation of removal requires
longer periods of physical presence in the United States and . . . it has so many more disqualifying provisions.” Id. at 1845. As a result, “it is [a] much more difficult [form of relief] to
obtain than 212(c) relief.” Id.
63. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 51–52 (“These legislative changes . . . resulted in
the deportation of thousands of Salvadorans who had lived in the United States for many
years.”); Kniffin, supra note 51, at 317–18 (noting that AEDPA and IIRIRA “resulted in the
mass deportation of young Central American criminals and their families between 2000 and
2004”).
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than 90 percent of the deportees.”64 Many of those deported were
members of the MS-13 and M-18 gangs.65
Deporting these gang members had devastating consequences
for the Northern Triangle. As an initial matter, many of the gang
members had come to the United States as children and, thus, had
little or no ties to Central America.66 In fact, many did not even
speak Spanish or know much about their home country’s culture.67
Many had no family ties or employment prospects in the region.68
They had “no resources, homes, or connections, other than their
gang ties.”69 As a result, these former gang members “reproduced
the structures and behaviors that had given them support and security in the United States.”70 In other words, they redeveloped
their old gangs,71 and, while doing so, found ready recruits among
many of the Northern Triangle’s impoverished and disillusioned
youth.72 Ultimately, as Daniel Kanstroom writes, the gangs “reorganized, re-armed, and brought with them a hard-edged, violent gang
culture they had learned in the United States.”73
The governments in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were
not prepared to confront the gangs. After all, these countries were
64.

WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: CONFLICT, SECURITY, AND DEVELOP78 (2011).
65. See id. (recognizing that many of the deportees were “members of the maras”); DIAZ,
supra note 46, at 163 (“With passage of [IIRIRA], thousands of MS-13 and 18th Street gangsters became instantly eligible to be frog-marched out of the country, without any of the
procedural delays that had slowed things down in the previous decade.”).
66. DIAZ, supra note 46, at 163.
67. Id.; see also Arana, supra note 48 (noting that “[m]any of the deportees were native
English speakers”).
68. DIAZ, supra note 46, at 163.
69. Kniffin, supra note 50, at 318; see also Arana, supra note 48 (“The deportees arrived in
Central America with few prospects other than their gang connections; many were members
of MS-13 and another vicious Los Angeles group, the 18th Street Gang.”).
70. WORLD BANK, supra note 64, at 78.
71. See DIAZ, supra note 46, at 163 (quoting FBI agent Leo Navarette, the Bureau’s legal
attaché in San Salvador, El Salvador, as saying, “These guys had no jobs and no money. They
looked around and realized that there was one thing they knew how to do and there was no
competition. So they formed gangs.”).
72. See DIAZ, supra note 46, at 163 (“Recruiting among the poor and marginalized youth
of Central America was easy.”); WORLD BANK, supra note 64, at 78 (noting that the gangs
“quickly attracted local youth”); Arana, supra note 48 (“[T]he Central American maras grew,
finding ready recruits among the region’s large population of disenfranchised youth.”).
73. KANSTROOM, supra note 1, at 154; see also FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 52–53 (“The
deported Salvadorans brought with them . . . the ‘process of violence’ that they had been
living in the United States—particularly the practice of staking out territory to defend against
encroachment by the rival gangs.”); SEELKE, supra note 14, at 3 (“Many contend that gangdeportees ‘exported’ a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America.”); WOLA Resource
Guide, supra note 41 (“These deportee gang members, with U.S. gang experience, are believed to have been a key catalyst for the evolution of Mara Salvatrucha and 18th Street gang
into the dominant gangs that they are today in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.”).
MENT
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already battling local inner-city gangs74 while trying to rebuild from
the civil wars and economic challenges of the 1980s.75 To make matters worse, U.S. immigration officials did not provide the Central
American governments with the deportees’ complete criminal history.76 Thus, law enforcement officials in the Northern Triangle
were unable to identify those new arrivals that posed the greatest
threat to their societies.77
With the Central American governments caught off guard, MS-13
and M-18 quickly seized control of entire neighborhoods and cities.78 The gangs then battled each other for more territory,79
sparking small wars between the rival groups.80 When the gangs
were not fighting each other, they were battling the police in hopes
of gaining even more ground.81
Meanwhile, the United States kept deporting more and more
gang members, who then joined their counterparts in the Northern
Triangle.82 As a result, MS-13 and M-18 rapidly increased their
ranks and evolved into much stronger, more complex groups.83
74. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 51 (noting that “youth gangs already existed in
Central American cities,” but that “they tended to be smaller, more diverse and tied to particular neighborhoods”); WOLA Resource Guide, supra note 41 (“The deportation of ganginvolved Central Americans from the United States complicated an existing local gang phenomenon in Central America.”).
75. See DIAZ, supra note 46, at 163 (“The explosion of the violent Los Angles gang culture immediately overloaded the fragile economies, social structures, and law enforcement
resources of poor countries barely climbing out of decades of civil war and brutal internal
conflict.”); Kniffin, supra note 51, at 318 (“Local governments were not stable at this time as
they were still working to rebuild following the bloody civil war that had recently plagued the
country.”).
76. See DIAZ, supra note 46, at 164 (“U.S. immigration authorities failed to tell the receiving governments that the deportees were gangsters. In fact, to this day, the United States only
informs the destination country of the deportee’s latest conviction, which is often a vanilla
immigration violation that masks more violent criminal behavior. ‘You could have spent the
last five years in jail on a murder charge, then get deported as a criminal alien,’ says [FBI
agent Leo] Navarette. ‘But the papers on you will only list the last charge, which is just being
an alien in the country illegally.’ A personal status as vaguely defined as ‘gang membership’ is
shared only in special cases.”). It is worth noting that, “in January 2014, the State Department
and DHS signed an agreement to expand a Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS)
program that has been used to share more information on certain criminal deportees with
Mexican law enforcement officials to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.” SEELKE, supra
note 14, at 8.
77. Kniffin, supra note 51, at 318.
78. See DIAZ, supra note 46, at 164.
79. Arana, supra note 48.
80. DIAZ, supra note 46, at 164.
81. Arana, supra note 48.
82. Id. (“As more and more hard-core gang members were expelled from Los Angeles,
the Central American maras grew.”).
83. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 53 (“[T]he U.S. government’s continued deportation of Salvadoran gang members has served to strengthen the transnational presence of
these gangs.”); Kniffin, supra note 51, at 318 (“As MS-13 grew in power, it evolved from a
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The gangs also became much more violent,84 perpetrating a wide
variety of crimes including murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion,
and drug trafficking.85 In Honduras, the gangs preferred to decapitate their victims and would either leave them lying in public ways
or would “string their disemboweled intestines along fences.”86
In response to the rising violence, the Central American governments adopted a series of authoritarian policies that focused on
incarcerating large numbers of suspected gang members.87 These
hardline policies, however, ultimately proved ineffective.88 The massive number of arrests led to extreme overcrowding in Central
America’s prisons.89 There, the gangs organized90 and recruited
more members,91 including youth who were wrongfully imprisoned
for gang activity in the first place.92 The gangs even killed dozens of
people in prison massacres across the region.93
Meanwhile, outside the prison walls, the gangs “retaliated against
the [government] crackdown by launching a wave of random violence.”94 Ultimately, despite the Central American governments’
strong-handed approach to fighting the gangs, homicide rates actually rose throughout the region.95 In El Salvador, the murder rate
jumped from 36.4 people per 100,000 in 2003 to 69.9 people per
territorial organization, focused on small ‘cliques’ (neighborhood groups), to a more complex vertical system that allowed for communication between groups.”).
84. See DIAZ, supra note 46, at 164–65 (“The Salvadoran versions of MS-13 and the 18th
Street gang erupted like volcanoes of criminal violence. . . . The gang virus spread to Guatemala and Honduras.”).
85. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT 43,
45 (2006) (discussing these crimes in the context of El Salvador).
86.

DIAZ, supra note 46, at 165.

87. See DIAZ, supra note 46, at 164 (“Gangsters and suspected gangsters were rounded
up, often on the basis of a tattoo alone, and stuffed into the country’s abysmal prisons.”);
SEELKE, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing these authoritarian measures, including the so-called
“Mano Dura,” or “iron fist,” anti-gang policies adopted in El Salvador and Honduras).
88. See SEELKE, supra note 14, at 9 (“Despite the early apparent benefits of Mano Dura
policies, effects on gangs and crime proved to be largely disappointing.”).
89. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 148 (“The massive number of arrests under the
anti-gang crackdown since 2003 has placed a severe burden on El Salvador’s prison system,
exacerbating the conditions of overcrowding.”).
90.

DIAZ, supra note 46, at 164–65.

91. See SHIFTER, supra note 7, at 9 (“The mass incarceration of suspected gang youth has
transformed prisons into recruiting centers for criminal groups.”).
92. See SEELKE, supra note 14, at 9 (“Some youth who were wrongly arrested for gang
involvement joined the gang life while in prison.”).
93. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 148–50 (discussing prison massacres in Aug. 2004,
Mar. 2006, and Jan. 2007).
94. Arana, supra note 48.
95. See U.N. HOMICIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126.
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100,000 in 2011.96 Likewise, in Honduras, the murder rate increased from 61.4 in 2003 to 91.4 in 2011.97 And in Guatemala, the
homicide rate rose from 35.1 in 2003 to 38.6 in 2011.98 In light of
these statistics, many law enforcement officers in Central America
concede that their governments’ iron fist policies failed, leaving the
gangs emboldened and the Northern Triangle in chaos.99 In 2011,
a senior U.S. military official declared the region “the deadliest
zone in the world outside active war zones.”100

B. The Modern Situation
After more than a decade of rising violence, there was a brief
breakthrough. In early 2012, El Salvador’s Minister of Justice and
Public Safety worked with a former lawmaker and a Catholic bishop
to help organize peace talks between the MS-13 and M-18 gangs.101
Following several meetings, the gangs’ top leaders “shook hands on
a pact to put an end to the killings.”102
Although the pact led to a brief drop in violence in El Salvador,103 the hope did not last. By mid-2013, the Salvadoran
government “withdrew its support for the truce mediators,”104 and
96. See id.; see also FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 117 (“In the years following the implementation of the Super Mano Dura Plan [in El Salvador], homicide rates continued to rise
sharply.”).
97. See U.N. HOMICIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126.
98. See id. By comparison, the United States’ homicide rate fell from 5.6 in 2003 to 4.7 in
2011. See id.
99. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 131 (“There is a growing consensus among many
observers, including law enforcement officials, that the Mano Dura policies and legislative
reforms . . . have been ineffective or even counterproductive. . . . A police official . . . told our
researchers that Mano Dura policies were widely recognized as a failure.”); WOLA Resource
Guide, supra note 41 (“Even the director of the Salvadoran National Civilian Police has stated
publicly that mano dura has failed.”).
100. See Anna Mulrine, Pentagon: Central America ‘Deadliest’ Non-War Zone in the World,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/
0411/Pentagon-Central-America-deadliest-non-war-zone-in-the-world.
101. See SEELKE, supra note 14, at 11; Randal C. Archibold, Gangs’ Truce Buys El Salvador a
Tenuous Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, at A1.
102. See Archibold, supra note 101.
103. See SEELKE, supra note 14, at 11 (“[Organization of American States] Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza . . . praised the truce for reducing the homicide rate in El Salvador
and effectively saving the lives of thousands of young people.”); Archibold, supra note 101
(“[T]he two gangs are virtual armies that have the power to affect the security of the entire
region—and they have used it to terrorize populations still weary from years of civil war and
instability. Now the truce is moving this country in the opposite direction, the authorities
contend, leading a precipitous drop in violence.”).
104. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43616, EL SALVADOR: BACKGROUND
AND U.S. RELATIONS 12 (2014). The exact reason for the Salvadoran government’s actions is
unclear. However, the truce’s mediators and negotiators allege that Salvadoran President
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the agreement fell apart.105 The gangs quickly regrouped into
stronger, more sophisticated organizations,106 and they committed
many more acts of violence.107 Since mid-2013, El Salvador’s “homicide rate has been rising,”108 and a recent report indicates that the
murder rate is reaching record levels.109
The situation is also dire in both Honduras and Guatemala,
where the gang truce never really had an impact. In Honduras, the
homicide rate remains extremely high,110 and the country now has
the highest murder rate in the world.111 In Guatemala, which has
the fifth highest homicide rate on earth, murders are also on the
rise.112
In addition to murdering thousands of people, the gangs are responsible for numerous other crimes, including drug-trafficking,
violent street crime, weapons smuggling, robbery, extortion,
human trafficking, and sexual assault.113 The gangs also commit
Mauricio Funes withdrew support for the truce “when it became politically untenable for his
political party . . . leading up to the presidential election.” Michael Lohmuller, COUNCIL ON
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Salvadoran President Rejects Gang Truce, Security Policy Remains Unclear
(June 13, 2014), http://www.coha.org/salvadoran-president-rejects-gang-truce-security-policy-remains-unclear/ [hereinafter COHA Article]. President Funes, on the other hand,
blames the truce’s failure on escalating violence between competing factions of the M-18
gang. See id.
105. SEELKE, supra note 104, at 12.
106. A U.S. Congressional report warned that, “should the truce collapse, the gangs
could emerge even more powerful and organized after taking advantage of less restrictive
prison conditions.” SEELKE, supra note 104, at 12. This appears to have happened, as a Salvadoran law enforcement official recently said, “We are dealing with a reorganization of the
gangs. . . . During the truce, conditions were created for the gangs’ evolution and transformation into more sophisticated, stronger and more dangerous criminal organizations.” Lorena
Baires, El Salvador: Gang Violence Increases, INFOSURHOY.COM (May 1, 2014), https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20140708160542/http://infosurhoy.com/en_GB/articles/saii/features/main/
2014/05/01/feature-01.
107. SEELKE, supra note 104, at 12.
108. El Salvador Travel Warning, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr.
25, 2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/el-salvadortravel-warning.html (last visited July 1, 2014) [hereinafter April 2014 El Salvador Travel
Warning].
109. See Malkin, supra note 10.
110. See U.N. HOMICIDE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126. Although the homicide rate decreased marginally from 91.4 people per 100,000 in 2011 to 90.4 people per 100,000 in 2012,
the actual number of homicides rose from 7,104 in 2011 to 7,172 in 2012. See id.
111. See id. The homicide rate in Honduras is over forty percent higher than Venezuela,
the country with the second highest homicide rate in the world. See id. at 126–27.
112. See id. at 126. The U.N.’s report shows that Guatemala’s homicide rate increased
from 38.6 homicides per 100,000 people in 2011 to 39.9 homicides per 100,000 people in
2012. These are the latest statistics from the U.N.
113. See SEELKE, supra note 104, at 4–5; SHIFTER, supra note 7, at 6; April 2014 El Salvador
Travel Warning, supra note 108.
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numerous kidnappings throughout the region.114 This violence affects all portions of the Northern Triangle’s population.115 Indeed,
ordinary individuals are regularly victims of the gang violence simply because they live in a region controlled by gangs.116 The gangs
also specifically target various parts of society, such as the police,
business owners, women, and girls.117 In short, “victims of gang violence come from all segments of society.”118
That said, the chief victims of gang violence are young people.119
As an initial matter, the MS-13 and M-18 gangs “rely heavily on
forced recruitment to expand and maintain their membership.”120
The gangs usually target impoverished and marginalized young
people, including children as young as eight years old.121 In fact,
the gangs start recruiting children at schools and youth centers.122
By using aggressive recruitment tactics,123 the MS-13 and M-18
gangs now have between 54,000 and 85,000 members in the Northern Triangle.124
The gangs then retaliate against young people who refuse to join
their ranks. Indeed, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has recognized that “[t]he primary victims of
youth gang-related violence are other young people,” especially
those who oppose recruitment.125
114. See SEELKE, supra note 104, at 4–5; SHIFTER, supra note 7, at 6. In fact, the State
Department recently said, “In 2013, the number of people reported as missing in El Salvador
increased by 93 percent, [and] [a]uthorities believe a significant number of disappearances
are related to gang activity.” See April 2014 El Salvador Travel Warning, supra note 108.
115. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
116. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (BIA 2014) (stating that, in the context of
Central America, “the residents all generally suffer from the gang’s criminal efforts to sustain
its enterprise in the area.”); UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 16, at 4 (“Ordinary people
may be exposed to gang-violence simply because of being residents of areas controlled by
gangs.”).
117. See UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 16, at 4–5 (describing a so-called “typology
of victims of organized gangs”).
118. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 250 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
119. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
120. UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 16, at 2.
121. See id.; FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 74.
122. JESSICA JONES & JENNIFER PODKUL, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, FORCED FROM HOME:
THE LOST BOYS AND GIRLS OF CENTRAL AMERICA 10 (2012) (“Gangs have increasingly begun
targeting children at their schools, resulting in El Salvador having one of the lowest school
attendance rates in Latin America.”); see also P.J. Tobia, No Country for Lost Kids, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 20, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/country-lost-kids/.
123. See FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 72–73.
124. See SEELKE, supra note 104, at 3 (citations omitted).
125. UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 16, at 4; see also FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at
88–92 (discussing how young people who refuse to join the gangs are among the most vulnerable people in Central America).
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Northern Triangle community leaders, gang members, and victims all attest to the gangs’ violence against young people who
oppose recruitment. For example, a judge in San Salvador’s juvenile courts told researchers at Harvard Law School, “A youth who
refuses to join a gang will likely be killed. This is what I have observed in most of the cases I have dealt with.”126 One former gang
member echoed this point, saying, “We killed several [people in the
neighborhood] for not wanting to join us. . . . We killed about six
guys around thirteen or fourteen years old.”127 Likewise, a seventeen-year-old victim recently told the UNHCR:
I left [El Salvador] because I had problems with the gangs.
They hung out by a field that I had to pass to get to school.
They said if I didn’t join them, they would kill me. I have many
friends who were killed or disappeared because they refused to
join the gang. I told the gang I didn’t want to. . . . The more
they saw me refusing to join, the more they started threatening
me and telling me they would kill me if I didn’t. They beat me
up five times for refusing to help them. The pain from the
beatings was so bad, I couldn’t even stand up. They killed a
friend of mine in March because he didn’t want to join, and
his body wasn’t found until May. I went to the police twice to
report the threats. They told me that they would do something; but when I saw that they weren’t doing anything to help,
I knew I had to leave.128
Every day, more and more young people reach the same conclusion and, therefore, they flee the Northern Triangle.129 Many of
these youth travel to nearby countries like Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
Panama, Mexico, and Belize; in fact, over the past few years, these
countries have seen a dramatic increase in the number of asylum
applications brought by individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras.130
That said, many other young people travel to the United States.
Although some parents make the journey with their children,131
others desperately pay “coyotes,” or human smugglers, thousands of
126. FARIÑA ET AL., supra note 16, at 70, 72.
127. Id. at 90.
128. UNHCR CHILDREN ON THE RUN REPORT, supra note 19.
129. See infra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
130. UNHCR CHILDREN ON THE RUN REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 15.
131. See Carrie Kahn, The Surge in Single Women with Children at the U.S.-Mexican Border,
NPR NEWS (June 20, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/06/20/323844514/single-womenwith-young-children-inundate-u-s-mexico-border (“[I]t’s not just minor children rushing to
the border. Large numbers of single women with kids are coming as well.”).
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dollars to take their children to the United States.132 Those children
whose families cannot afford to hire a coyote must walk, hitchhike,
and ride on top of freight trains heading north.133 Some even cross
the dangerous Rio Grande river in order to make it to the United
States.134
This long journey can be deadly. During the trip, criminals sometimes kidnap children and hold them for ransom or subject them
to sexual assault.135 Several children have been maimed or killed
after falling off trains.136 Other children risk their lives wandering
across deserts with no food or water.137 And still others drown trying
to swim across rivers.138
Despite the treacherous journey, many children continue to arrive at the United States’ southern border.139 In fact, the number of
unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who have been apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection increased from 3,933 in FY 2011 to 10,146 in FY 2012 to
20,805 in FY 2013.140 And in FY 2014, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection apprehended 51,705 unaccompanied children from the
Northern Triangle.141
Several studies confirm that these children come to the United
States mainly because of societal violence in the Northern Triangle.
The UNHCR recently interviewed hundreds of unaccompanied
children about why they left their home countries, and a large number specifically discussed the gang violence.142 In a similar study, the
132. See Tobia, supra note 122.
133. See id. (“Those too poor to hire a coyote to arrange transport are forced to walk and
hitchhike much of the way. In Mexico they ride atop trains.”).
134. See id. (“Crossing the Rio Grande river is also dangerous, especially for a child. [An
eleven-year-old boy from Honduras named] Nodwin forded the river in an inflatable raft that
sunk when it was punctured on a sharp rock. ‘I went under the water,’ he recalls, ‘but I
managed to grab onto a piece of wood, and that’s how I saved myself.’ Nodwin was clinging
to that piece of wood when he finally entered the United States.”).
135. See id.; Lisa Riordan Seville & Hannah Rappleye, Border Children Tell Their Stories: Why
We Came to the U.S., NBC NEWS (June 12, 2014), http://www.nbcnews. com/news/investigations/border-children-tell-their-stories-why-we-came-us-n129646.
136. See Tobia, supra note 122. For more information about the dangerous journey north
via freight train, see Wilson Sayre, Riding ‘The Beast’ Across Mexico to the U.S. Border, NPR NEWS
(June 5, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/06/05/318905712/riding-thebeast-across-mexico-to-the-u-s-border.
137. See JONES & PODKUL, supra note 122, at 8.
138. See id.
139. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection Statistics, supra note 20.
140. Id.
141. Id. Notably, this statistic does not capture the large number of single women with
children who have recently arrived at the border. See Kahn, supra note 131.
142. See UNHCR CHILDREN ON THE RUN REPORT, supra note 19. Notably, the report states
that “[t]he threat of serious harm at the hands of armed criminal actors was pervasive
throughout the [Salvadoran] children’s interviews. The children from El Salvador who had
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Women’s Refugee Commission found that “[c]hildren from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador cited the growing influence of
youth gangs and drug cartels as their primary reason for leaving.”143
And in July 2014, the American Immigration Council issued a report recognizing that “[t]he most common cause of
[unaccompanied alien children’s] exodus from Central America
has been and continues to be increasing gang and cartel violence
that disproportionately affects them as young people.”144
In response to the large number of unaccompanied children arriving at the southern border, some government officials and
members of the media acknowledge that these children are fleeing
a humanitarian crisis in the Northern Triangle.145 But what is being
overlooked is that many of these children now face their own legal
crisis here in the United States. Indeed, the children are put in removal proceedings where they face significant barriers to obtaining
relief from removal.

II. THE LEGAL CRISIS: BARRIERS TO OBTAINING
RELIEF FROM REMOVAL
This Part analyzes the hurdles that unaccompanied children
from the Northern Triangle must confront while trying to obtain
relief from removal. This Part first puts the discussion in context by
explaining what these children experience when they arrive at the
border. Then, it briefly highlights some of the procedural challenges children face in removal proceedings. Finally, it examines
the main forms of relief available to individuals fleeing humanitarian crises and shows that many of the children from the Northern
Triangle will face significant substantive challenges while trying to
gain these protections. Therefore, this Part concludes that, under
our current immigration laws, many of the children are at risk of
being deported and facing the same fate as Benito Zaldı́var.

not yet been victims of the violence spoke of their and their families’ fear with the same
inevitability.” Id. at 33.
143. JONES & PODKUL, supra note 122, at 1.
144. ELIZABETH KENNEDY, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, NO CHILDHOOD HERE: WHY CENTRAL AMERICAN CHILDREN ARE FLEEING THEIR HOMES 5 (2014).
145. See, e.g., Haeyoun Park, Q. and A. Children at the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/15/us/questions-about-the-border-kids.html.
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A. Arriving at the Border
In 2008, President George W. Bush signed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA).146 This law established standards for how federal officials
should treat an apprehended “unaccompanied alien child,”147
which is defined as “a child who has no lawful immigration status in
the United States, has not attained 18 years of age, and with respect
to whom there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States
or . . . [one who] is available to provide care and physical
custody.”148
With respect to an unaccompanied child from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, the DHS first processes the child by gathering
biographic and biometric information, confirming the child’s unaccompanied status, conducting an initial health screening, and
running a criminal background check.149 The TVPRA then dictates
that, within seventy-two hours of determining that the child meets
the definition of an “unaccompanied alien child,” the DHS must
transfer custody of the child to an office within the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) known as the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR).150
The ORR then completes a thorough intake process and initially
places the child in a state-licensed shelter or other facility.151 That
facility must provide the child with a classroom education, recreational activities, and basic health care, including mental health
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012). This measure, aimed at combating sex trafficking,
“breez[ed] through Congress . . . with bipartisan backing [and] without so much as a recorded vote in the Senate.” Carl Hulse, Migrant Surge Traced to Law on Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2014, at A1.
147. See 8 U.S.C. § 1232.
148. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012). Notably, “[a] juvenile is classified as unaccompanied if
neither a parent nor a legal guardian is with the juvenile alien at the time of apprehension,
or within a geographic proximity to quickly provide care for the juvenile.” LISA SEGHETTI ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW 1 n.9
(2014) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(b)(1) (2012)).
149. See SEGHETTI, supra note 148, at 5, 5 n.20; Unaccompanied Children at the Southwest
Border, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/unaccompanied-children-southwest-border (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3); see also SEGHETTI, supra note 148, at 5 n.21 (“The 72-hour
time period was established in statute by the TVPRA.”). For more information on the ORR,
see Office of Refugee Resettlement, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.acf.hhs
.gov/programs/orr.
151. See OLGA BYRNE & ELISE MILLER, VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, THE FLOW OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A RESOURCE FOR PRACTITIONERS, POLICY
MAKERS, AND RESEARCHERS 14–15 (2012); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c) (noting that, ultimately,
HHS is responsible for “[p]roviding safe and secure placements for [the unaccompanied]
children”).
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services.152 Most children remain in the shelter between one week
and four months.153
During this time, and in accordance with the TVPRA, the ORR
works on promptly placing the child “in the least restrictive setting
that is in the best interest of the child.”154 The ORR usually places
the child with a relative, family friend, or other sponsor in the
United States.155 Finally, while all of this is happening, the DHS initiates removal proceedings against the child.156 During removal
proceedings, the child runs into both procedural and substantive
hurdles.157
B. Procedural Hurdles
The DHS initiates removal proceedings against the child by serving him or her with a Notice to Appear (NTA) and filing that NTA
at one of the many immigration courts across the country.158 An
immigration judge then conducts the removal proceedings, which
are administrative hearings.159 A DHS trial attorney represents the
152. See BYRNE & MILLER, supra note 151, at 14.
153. Id. at 4. The average stay is sixty-one days. Id.
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2).
155. See BYRNE & MILLER, supra note 151, at 17–19. Notably, “[i]n making these placement determinations, ORR conducts a background investigation . . . of the adult assuming
legal guardianship for the UAC.” SEGHETTI, supra note 148, at 5; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)
(establishing the procedures HHS must follow to ensure it is “[p]roviding safe and secure
placements for children”).
156. See 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D) (“Any unaccompanied alien child sought to be removed by the Department of Homeland Security . . . shall be placed in removal proceedings
under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1229a).”).
157. See generally LISA FRYDMAN ET AL., A TREACHEROUS JOURNEY: CHILD MIGRANTS NAVIGATING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2014). In this incredibly comprehensive report, Frydman
and her colleagues first discussed the “procedural challenges” and “substantive challenges”
facing unaccompanied children in removal proceedings. See id. at 8–60 (examining the substantive challenges in great detail); id. at 61–74 (examining the procedural challenges at
length). This rich resource, which is repeatedly cited infra, focuses on the lack of child-sensitive standards when it comes to both the substantive forms of relief from removal and the
procedures in immigration courts. The report then offers a series of specific recommendations, including calling on Congress to “enact legislation mandating the provision of legal
counsel for unaccompanied children in deportation proceedings.” See id. at vii. This is just
one of the report’s many thoughtful recommendations. See generally id.
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2012); see also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN,
HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 1148 (7th ed. 2012) (“Proceedings formally commence when the government files
the NTA with the clerk of the immigration court.”). The immigration courts are housed
within the United States Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review. See
id. at 1159. For an interesting discussing of the possible flaws in this structure, as well as a
novel solution, see Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an
Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3 (2008).
159. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (b)(1).
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government at these hearings, and, assuming that the child has no
lawful immigration status in the United States, the child bears the
burden of proving that he or she is entitled to some form of relief
from removal.160 Ultimately, the immigration judge formally adjudicates the child’s case by granting or denying his or her application
for relief.161
As an initial matter, these removal proceedings can be very intimidating to a child.162 The child recently fled his or her home
country and may be far away from family. Moreover, the child must
now face a government lawyer in an adversarial proceeding before
an immigration judge in a formal courtroom.163 The University of
California Hastings College of the Law Center for Gender and Refugee Studies recently represented one child in removal
proceedings whose experience is illustrative:
A Honduran boy fled brutal violence at the hands of gang
members. He was apprehended at the border, placed in ORR
custody, and put in removal proceedings. The boy was terrified
of being deported, because he was convinced that gang members would kill him on sight. . . . He could not sleep the nights
before each court appearance. He also vomited before each
court appearance and shook uncontrollably every time he entered the courtroom.164
160. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4).
161. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A). Once the immigration judge issues a decision, either
the non-citizen child or DHS may appeal that decision to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3)
(2015). The BIA is the appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration Review.
See id. at § 1003.1(a)(1). If the non-citizen child loses before the BIA, he or she may “file a
petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the removal
hearing was held.” See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 684 (6th ed., Foundation Press 2015) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)
(2012)).
There is, however, an important exception to this basic process in which the litigation
begins in an immigration court. According to the TVPRA, an unaccompanied child who
applies for asylum will first have his or her application considered by a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services asylum officer in a non-adversarial setting. See William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(7)(B),
112 Stat. 5044, 5081 (2008). But if the asylum officer does not grant the child’s application,
the officer will refer the child’s asylum case to an immigration court. See Types of Asylum
Decisions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/types-asylum-decisions (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“If we are unable to
approve your asylum application and you are in the United States illegally, we will forward
(or refer) your asylum case to the Immigration Court.”).
162. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 62–63 (discussing the intimidating nature of
removal proceedings).
163. See id.
164. Id. at 63.
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The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has taken
steps to reduce the intimidating nature of removal proceedings for
unaccompanied children.165 In fact, EOIR even adopted “Guidelines for Immigration Court Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien
Children.”166 These guidelines provide, among other things, that
“[e]very immigration judge is expected to employ child sensitive
procedures whenever a child respondent or witness is present in
the courtroom.”167 Nevertheless, these guidelines are mere “suggestions,”168 and they cannot change the fact that “[r]emoval
proceedings remain inherently adversarial in nature.”169
These proceedings are also complex.170 Indeed, for a child to establish that he or she is eligible for relief from removal, that child
must present evidence on his or her own behalf and, ideally, should
be prepared to challenge the government’s evidence and cross-examine its witnesses.171 Beyond these evidentiary hurdles, “the
proceedings are governed by a complicated substantive legal
scheme, which includes international law, federal statutes and regulations, and case law that varies by jurisdiction.”172
Moreover, most unaccompanied children are not represented by
a lawyer in their removal proceedings.173 The INA contains a section entitled “right to counsel,” which provides that an individual in
removal proceedings “shall have the privilege of being represented
165. See id. at 61 (“EOIR should be commended for having taken several positive steps to
address the way immigration judges handle children’s cases.”).
166. Memorandum from David L. Neal, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigration
Judges, Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 07-01: Guidelines for Immigration
Court Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Children (May 22, 2007), available at http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2007/05/22/07-01.pdf [hereinafter EOIR
Guidelines]; see also FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 61 (discussing these guidelines in
detail).
167. EOIR Guidelines, supra note 166, at 3; see also FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 61
(discussing this very provision).
168. EOIR Guidelines, supra note 166, at 3; see also FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 61
(“The EOIR Guidelines are not binding on all judges, nor do judges follow them
consistently.”).
169. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 62; see also id. at 84 (“Children further experience
difficulties in the immigration system due to the adversarial nature of removal proceedings
designed for adults.”).
170. See id. at 3 (calling removal proceedings “undeniably complicated”); id. at 84 (characterizing the proceedings as “highly complex”); Shani M. King, Alone and Unrepresented: A
Call to Congress to Provide Counsel for Unaccompanied Minors, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331, 338
(2013) (discussing the evidentiary and legal complexity of removal proceedings).
171. See King, supra note 170, at 338 (“The proceedings allow for the examination of
evidence against the child, the child’s presentation of evidence on her own behalf, and the
opportunity for the child to cross-examine government’s witnesses.”) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(4)(B)).
172. King, supra note 170, at 338 (footnotes omitted).
173. See id. (“Despite this complexity and the high stakes for unaccompanied minors, at
least half of these children face removal proceedings without an attorney.”); FRYDMAN ET AL.,
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by . . . counsel.”174 But this section explicitly states that the privilege
comes “at no expense to the Government.”175 And since removal
proceedings are considered civil in nature,176 the Sixth Amendment’s right to appointed counsel in criminal proceedings does not
apply.177 As a result, most unaccompanied children attend their removal proceedings without a lawyer.178
It is true that the TVPRA requires HHS to “make every effort to
utilize the services of pro bono counsel who agree to provide representation to [unaccompanied] children without charge.”179 It is also
true that many lawyers and law school clinics provide pro bono representation to unaccompanied children in removal proceedings.180
Nevertheless, as Professor Shani King points out, these “pro bono
attorneys . . . reach only a fraction of the children who need representation.”181 According to a 2014 joint report issued by the Center
for Gender and Refugee Studies and Kids in Need of Defense,
“most children appearing before immigration judges are still
unrepresented.”182
supra note 157, at 3 (“[M]ore than half [of the children in removal proceedings] must navigate this undeniably complicated adversarial system without an attorney while using an
unfamiliar language.” (footnote omitted)).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
175. Id.
176. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is
a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country.”).
177. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43613, ALIENS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF 6 (2014) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment explicitly refers to ‘the
Assistance of Counsel’ in ‘criminal proceedings,’ and removal proceedings are civil in nature.
Thus, courts have deemed it appropriate that aliens subject to removal receive a different
degree of protections than criminal defendants because removal proceedings are civil, not
criminal.” (footnotes omitted)).
178. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at iii (“[T]he majority of unaccompanied children
facing removal do not have lawyers.”).
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(5) (2012); see also FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 75 (quoting
this same language).
180. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 75 (“This directive [from the TVPRA] has helped
support an innovative public-private partnership model in which pro bono attorneys from
law firms, corporations, and law schools represent unaccompanied children in immigration
proceedings. The model has been increasingly effective, establishing hundreds of partnerships that have resulted in the representation of more than 2,300 children in their removal
proceedings, and creating a nationwide pool of thousands of attorneys trained to represent
unaccompanied children.”).
181. King, supra note 170, at 341.
182. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at iii. Recently, bills introduced in both the House of
Representatives and Senate would require the Government to provide counsel to unaccompanied children in removal proceedings. See S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013–14); H.R. 15, 113th
Cong. (2013–14); H.R. 4936, 113th Cong. (2013–14). However, to date, Congress has not
passed these bills.
In June 2014, the Department of Justice and the Corporation for National and Community Service, the organization that administers the AmeriCorps program, announced a new
grant program known as Justice AmeriCorps, “that will enroll approximately 100 lawyers and
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Without a lawyer, a child in removal proceedings is at a severe
disadvantage. After all, “representation is often considered the most
important factor affecting the outcome of immigration proceedings.”183 Indeed, studies show that unrepresented individuals are
much less likely to obtain relief from removal than represented individuals.184 For example, in one comprehensive study, three
scholars reached an important conclusion:
[W]hether an asylum seeker is represented in court is the single most important factor affecting the outcome of her case.
Represented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of
45.6%, almost three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for
those without legal counsel. The regression analyses confirmed that, with all other variables in the study held constant,
represented asylum seekers were substantially more likely to
win their case than those without representation.185
Simply put, without an attorney, a child’s immigration case has little
chance of even getting off the ground.
In sum, the unaccompanied children from the Northern Triangle are put in removal proceedings that can be very intimidating
and complex. Plus, many of the children will have to face these proceedings without a lawyer, which makes “a positive outcome . . . far
less likely.”186

C. Substantive Hurdles
Beyond the foregoing procedural challenges, many of the children will also face significant substantive hurdles when trying to
paralegals as AmeriCorps members to provide legal services to the most vulnerable of the[ ]
[unaccompanied] children.” See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and
CNCS Announce New Partnership to Enhance Immigration Courts and Provide Critical Legal Assistance to Unaccompanied Minors (June 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2014/June/14-ag-609.html. However, immigrants’ advocates have suggested “that at best it
would only touch a fraction of all the unaccompanied minors expected to appear in court in
the coming months.” Kirk Semple, Youths Facing Deportation to Be Given Legal Counsel, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2014, at A11.
183. King, supra note 170, at 338.
184. See id. (“[S]tudies show a correlation between representation and outcome.”).
185. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007); see also King, supra note 170,
at 338 n.43 (discussing this data).
186. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at iii. For a thorough discussion of other “procedural issues in children’s immigration cases,” see id. at 61–74.
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avoid deportation.187 This Part examines the main forms of relief
available to individuals fleeing humanitarian crises, focusing on asylum.188 It also briefly considers protection under the Convention
Against Torture, visas for victims of human trafficking or other
crimes, and special immigrant juvenile status.189 This Part concludes that many of the children from the Northern Triangle will
have a hard time gaining these protections.190

1. Asylum
Young people fleeing gang recruitment in the Northern Triangle
arrive in the United States and often apply for asylum.191 U.S. asylum law is rooted in the principle of international refugee
protection established in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees192 and reaffirmed in the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees.193 In 1968, the United States signed the Protocol and thus became bound by its provisions and those of the
Convention.194 Then, twelve years later, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which amended the INA, and in many ways,
brought federal immigration law into agreement with the Convention and Protocol.195
187. Lisa Frydman and her colleagues first discussed the “substantive challenges” that
unaccompanied children confront in removal proceedings in their 2014 report. See id. at
8–60 (examining these challenges).
188. See also id. at 8-24 (discussing the many “substantive issues in children’s asylum
claims” and, ultimately, recommending that immigration officials adopt child-sensitive standards in asylum cases).
189. See also id. at 24-25, 37-53 (examining the substantive challenges surrounding these
other forms of relief from removal).
190. See id. at v. (“[T]he current forms of relief do not provide adequate protection, especially for unaccompanied children, from return to situations where they face . . .
circumstances harmful to their well-being.”); id. at 54 (“Current law does not provide sufficient immigration options for children. Existing humanitarian relief . . . benefit[s] only a
small percentage of children.”); id. (“[C]hild applicants face significant barriers to being
granted the primary forms of humanitarian relief . . . that are available to children.”).
191. See Emily Bazelon, Who Gets to Stay?, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/immigrants_seeking_asylum_courts_say
_yes_for_domestic_violence_no_for_gang.html (discussing the asylum claims made by unaccompanied children).
192. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
193. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
194. See DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 90 (2d ed., 2013).
195. See id. at 91; Kniffin, supra note 51, at 320 (“In 1980, Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act, conveying its intent to bring the United States into compliance with both the
Convention and the Protocol.”).
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Now, under the INA, a person may qualify for asylum if he or she
meets the definition of a refugee.196 A refugee is defined as,
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.197
Thus, in order to be eligible for asylum, an individual must establish that (1) he or she suffered past persecution or has a wellfounded fear of future persecution (2) on account of (3) a statutorily protected ground—race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, and (4) the government in his or her home country is either unable or unwilling to
protect him or her from that persecution.198 The asylum applicant
must also demonstrate that he or she warrants a favorable exercise
of discretion.199
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
198. Id. If the asylum applicant establishes past persecution, then he or she is “presumed
to have a well-founded fear of [future] persecution on the basis of the original claim.” 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2015). The burden then switches to the DHS to rebut that presumption by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that either (1) “[t]here has been a
fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded
fear of persecution in the applicant’s country of nationality . . . on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion;” or (2) “[t]he applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s
country of nationality . . . , and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect
the applicant to do so.” Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)–(B).
That said, even if the asylum applicant cannot prove that he or she suffered persecution
in the past, the applicant may still qualify for asylum by showing that he or she has a wellfounded fear of future persecution that is both objectively and subjectively reasonable. See id.
§ 208.13(b); see also Jin Chen v. Holder, 526 F. App’x 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2013) (“An alien applying for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution must establish both an
objectively and subjectively reasonable fear of future persecution.”).
199. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2012) (“An alien
applying for relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof to establish that the
alien—(i) satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements; and (ii) with respect to any form or
relief that is granted in the exercise of discretion, that the alien merits a favorable exercise of
discretion.” (emphasis added)). Ultimately, if the applicant receives asylum, he or she “may
remain in the United States and eventually obtain permanent residency and citizenship.”
Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 385 (2014) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
In addition to asylum, an individual can apply for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3). This provision captures the international legal principle of “nonrefoulement.”
See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 91. It states that the Government “may not remove an
alien to a country if . . . the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened . . . because of the
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Many children fleeing gang recruitment in the Northern Triangle should be able to prove both the first and fourth elements of an
asylum case. After all, with respect to the first element, numerous
children have been threatened, beaten, and raped for refusing to
join the gangs,200 and courts have determined that each of these
can constitute “persecution.”201 With respect to the fourth element,
there appears to be ample evidence that the governments in the
Northern Triangle are at least unable, if not unwilling, to control
the gangs.202
That said, the children will have a much harder time establishing
that the persecution they are fleeing is on account of a statutorily
protected ground.203 For starters, many children fleeing gang recruitment are unable to show that they have been or would be
persecuted because of their race, religion, or nationality.204 Therefore, most allege persecution on account of their membership in a
particular social group or, to a lesser extent, their political opinion.205 In fact, the most common arguments made by children
refusing to join gangs are that they have been or will be targeted
alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). While there are some differences “between asylum
and withholding of removal, each protection requires a claimant to demonstrate his fear of
persecution is on account of [a statutorily protected ground].” Linda Kelly Hill, The Gangs of
Asylum, 46 GA. L. REV. 639, 640–41 (2012). Thus, these two forms of relief are effectively
considered together in this section on asylum.
200. See supra notes 113–128 and accompanying text.
201. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 4:13, 4:19 (2014).
Although neither the INA nor federal regulations define “persecution,” courts have described the term as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ . . . in a way
regarded as offensive.” Id. § 4:4 (quotation marks and citations omitted). These courts have
also explicitly determined that threats, beatings, and rapes can all meet this definition. See id.
§§ 4:13, 4:19.
202. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43716, ASYLUM AND GANG VIOLENCE:
LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2014) (“Gang activity is wide-spread in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and attempts by these governments to control such activity have been seen as
ineffective, at best.” (footnote omitted)).
203. See 2 Immigration Law Service 2d § 10:164 (2014) (“Gang-related asylum claims have
been filed by applicants who . . . oppose recruitment and gang-related activity. These applicants face difficulties in their claims in defining the ground for asylum and the nexus
between that ground and the persecution that they have faced or will face in the future as a
result of recruitment efforts made against them.”).
204. See Kniffin, supra note 51, at 322 (“[M]any individuals fleeing MS-13 cannot demonstrate that they suffered persecution due to their race, religion, [or] nationality.”).
205. See KATE M. MANUEL & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43623, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN–LEGAL ISSUES: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 16
(2014) (“Those seeking asylum based on gang-related violence have often asserted persecution on account of membership in a particular social group or, less commonly, political
opinion.”); ANKER, supra note 201, § 5:56 (“[I]ncreasing numbers of claims have been
brought by Central Americans fleeing warfare involving ‘gangs’ in that region. Some claims
have been raised under the political opinion ground, but many have been conceptualized
under the particular social group (PSG) ground.”); UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 16,
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back home (1) because of their membership in the particular social
group of youth who have been recruited by gangs but refused to
join,206 and/or (2) because of their anti-gang political opinion.207
However, as the following discussion shows, the case law on membership in a particular social group and political opinion developed
in such a way that it now serves as a major roadblock to these asylum claims.208

a. Membership in a Particular Social Group
Many young people fleeing gang recruitment contend that they
are eligible for asylum based on their membership in a particular
social group.209 As an initial matter, “Congress did not directly
speak on the issue of what constitutes a ‘particular social group.’”210
Indeed, the statute does not define the phrase,211 and the legislative
history is likewise unhelpful.212 Therefore, the BIA, federal circuit
at 10 (“Jurisprudential developments suggest that gang-related asylum claims have most frequently been analysed within the 1951 Convention ground of ‘membership of a particular
social group’ and/or ‘political opinion.’ ”).
206. See, e.g., In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (BIA 2014) (defining the social
group as “Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but who have refused
to join because they oppose the gangs.”); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593 (BIA
2008) (“[P]ersons resistant to gang membership (refusing to join when recruited).”); Matter
of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (BIA 2008) (“Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to
recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang.”).
207. See, e.g., In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 596; In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 588; INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 480 (1992).
208. See Hill, supra note 199, at 641 (“[V]irtually all permutations of gang-based claims
are being denied.”); Jillian N. Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence: A Reason to Grant Political Asylum
from Mexico and Central America, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 31, 36 (2012) (recognizing that the
BIA’s case law regarding social group “appears to be a serious impediment to gang-based
asylum,” and adding that “the BIA has yet to make a favorable ruling on [political opinion
gang-based asylum] claims.”).
209. See Galya Ruffer, Gang-Based Asylum Claims, RIGHTS IN EXILE PROGRAMME, http://
www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/gang-based-asylum-claims (last visited July 18, 2014)
(“Most of the gang-related asylum cases are made under the ground of ‘particular social
group’ which is generally a contested and evolving area of asylum law.”); Kniffin, supra note
51, at 322 (“[M]ost [individuals fleeing MS-13] base their asylum claim on their membership
in a particular social group.” (emphasis in original)).
210. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2006).
211. See, e.g., Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting) (“The asylum statute uses the term ‘particular social group’ but gives no clue
as to what it means.”); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Virtually any set
including more than one person could be described as a ‘particular social group.’ . . . [T]he
statutory language standing alone is not very instructive.”).
212. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to
Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 514 (1993) (“The legislative
history of the 1980 Refugee Act sheds little light on the social group aspect of the refugee
definition.”).
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courts, and scholars all recognize that “particular social group” is an
ambiguous phrase in the INA.213 Moreover, Congress delegated lawmaking power to the Attorney General to interpret ambiguous
provisions of the INA, and the Attorney General, in turn, delegated
this power to the BIA.214 Thus, federal circuit courts generally give
Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of “particular social
group.”215 Ultimately, the BIA defined that phrase through a caseby-case process,216 and, in doing so, began to close the doors to asylum for young people fleeing gang recruitment.217

i. The Starting Point: “A Common, Immutable Characteristic”
The BIA first defined “particular social group” in 1985 in Matter
of Acosta.218 There, the BIA said that the other statutorily protected
grounds—race, religion, nationality, and political opinion—each
involve “an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that is either
beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental
to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to
be changed.”219 The BIA likewise interpreted “particular social
213. See, e.g., In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 230 (BIA 2014) (“The phrase ‘membership in a particular social group’ . . . is ambiguous and difficult to define.”); Ngengwe v.
Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008) (“ ‘Particular social group’ is an ambiguous
phrase.”); Brian Edstrom, Assessing Asylum Claims from Children Born in Violation of China’s OneChild Policy: What the United States Can Learn from Australia, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 139, 148 (2009)
(noting that “one of the most ambiguous, problematic, and discussed portions of the definition of the term ‘refugee’ is the phrase ‘membership in a particular social group.’ ”).
214. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516–17 (2009) (“Congress has charged the Attorney General with administering the INA, and a ruling by the Attorney General with
respect to all questions of law shall be controlling. . . . The Attorney General, in turn, has
delegated to the BIA the discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by
law in the course of considering and determining cases before it.” (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
215. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Holder, 597 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). According Chevron
deference to the BIA, of course, means that the court “must uphold the [agency’s] interpretation as long as it is reasonable.” Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81,
89 (2007) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (saying that a
reviewing court must not disturb “a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.” (footnote omitted)).
216. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 231 (“Given the ambiguity and the potential breadth of the
phrase ‘particular social group,’ we favored a case-by-case determination of the particular
kind of group characteristics that would qualify under the Act.”).
217. See Kniffin, supra note 51, at 327 (saying that the BIA’s adjudication of social group
claims “has effectively shut the doors of the courthouse to . . . [those] fleeing the violence of
MS-13 in El Salvador, and other Central American countries.”).
218. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
219. Id.
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group” as “a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic . . . one that the members of the group either
cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”220
For two decades, the BIA’s decision in Acosta served as the framework for analyzing particular social group claims.221 However, it was
not clear whether young people who flee gang recruitment could
be seen as sharing “a common, immutable characteristic.”222 Before
this question could be answered definitively, the BIA expanded its
definition of “particular social group” to include the concepts of
“social visibility” and “particularity.”223

ii. Bringing in “Social Visibility” and “Particularity”
The BIA first introduced the concept of “social visibility” in 2006
in Matter of C-A-.224 That case involved an asylum applicant who argued that he had suffered past persecution in Colombia on account
of his membership in the particular social group of “noncriminal
drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel.”225
The BIA began its analysis by stating and applying the Acosta formulation.226 But the BIA did not base its decision solely on whether
members of the proposed social group shared “a common, immutable characteristic.” Rather, it also “considered as a relevant factor
the extent to which members of a society perceive those with the
characteristic in question as members of a social group.”227
With this in mind, the BIA turned to the proposed social group
and held that it was not “socially visible.”228 It explained that “the
conduct at issue . . . is generally out of the public view. In the normal course of events, an informant against the Cali cartel intends to
remain unknown and undiscovered.”229 Thus, the BIA denied the
220. Id. at 233.
221. See ANKER, supra note 201, § 5:43 (“Acosta has provided the accepted framework for
analyzing [particular social group].”).
222. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
223. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (BIA 2014) (discussing the BIA’s evolving
definition of “particular social group”).
224. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 (BIA 2006).
225. Id. at 957.
226. Id. at 955–59.
227. Id. at 957.
228. See id. at 960–61.
229. Id. at 960.
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asylum claim in part because it determined that members of Colombian society did not recognize noncriminal informants as a
distinct group.230
Six months later, in Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the BIA included
the concept of “particularity” in its analysis of a social group
claim.231 That case involved asylum applicants who claimed that
they had a well-founded fear of future persecution in Guatemala on
account of their membership in the particular social group of “affluent Guatemalans.”232
The BIA, however, held that this proposed group was not cognizable in part because it was not defined with sufficient
“particularity.”233 The BIA explained that “[t]he terms ‘wealthy’ and
‘affluent’ standing alone are too amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for determining group membership.”234 Thus,
the BIA concluded “that the proposed group of wealthy
Guatemalans is not . . . sufficiently defined as to meet the requirements of a particular social group within the meaning of the refugee
definition.”235 Accordingly, the BIA denied the asylum
applications.236
Ultimately, in the foregoing cases, the BIA expanded its definition of “particular social group” to include the concepts of “social
visibility” and “particularity.” However, the BIA did not make it
clear whether these concepts must be met in order for an individual
to establish a legally cognizable social group. And, more importantly, the BIA had not decided whether young people fleeing gang
recruitment constituted a valid social group under its changing definition. These issues were resolved in 2008 in Matter of S-E-G-.237

230. Id. at 960–61.
231. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (BIA 2007). It is true that, in Matter of C-A-,
the BIA briefly mentioned “the requirement of particularity.” In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at
957. But it was not until In re A-M-E- & J-G-U- that the BIA focused more directly on “particularity” as a separate consideration in the social group analysis. See 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76.
232. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73.
233. Id. at 76.
234. Id. at 76. The BIA reasoned that, “[d]epending upon one’s perspective, the wealthy
may be limited to the very top echelon; but a more expansive view might include small business owners and others living a relatively comfortable existence in a generally impoverished
country. Because the concept of wealth is so indeterminate, the proposed group could vary
from as little as 1 percent to as much as 20 percent of the population, or more.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
235. Id. at 74.
236. Id. at 77.
237. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008).
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iii. Establishing and Maintaining Three Distinct Requirements
and Repeatedly Rejecting Claims by Youth
Fleeing Gang Recruitment
In S-E-G-, the BIA put together its evolving definition of “particular social group,” and, in doing so, rejected the asylum claims of
youth who had been recruited by gangs in the Northern Triangle
but refused to join.238 The case involved sixteen-year-old brothers
and all too familiar facts:
[T]he MS-13 stole money from the brothers, harassed and
beat them for refusing to join their gang, and threatened to
rape or harm [their teenage sister]. . . . [A]rmed MS-13 gang
members warned the respondents that the brothers must join
the gang or else their bodies might end up in a dumpster or in
the street someday. . . . Eventually, the MS-13 warned the respondents that they had been given sufficient time to make a
decision about whether to join the gang, and they advised the
respondents to take the gang seriously because the threats
were not a game. . . . [T]he respondents also learned that the
MS-13 shot and killed a young boy in the neighborhood after
he refused to join the gang.239
Fearing for their lives, the brothers fled El Salvador with their
sister, came to the United States, and applied for asylum.240 They
argued that they suffered past persecution on account of their
membership in the particular social group of “Salvadoran youths
who have resisted gang recruitment.”241
The BIA began by articulating the requirements of a legally cognizable social group.242 The BIA first recognized that, pursuant to
Acosta, a proposed group’s members must “‘share a common, immutable characteristic . . . that members of the group either cannot
change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.’”243 The BIA
then added that “membership in a purported social group [also]
requires that the group have particular and well-defined boundaries,
238. See id.
239. Id. at 579–80.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 582. The sister applied for asylum on account of her membership in the proposed social group of “family members of such Salvadoran youth.” Id.
242. See id. at 582–83.
243. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582–83 (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA
1985)).
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and that it possesses a recognized level of social visibility.”244 The
BIA explained that it was elevating the concepts of “particularity”
and “social visibility” to separate requirements in order to provide
“greater specificity to the definition of a social group.”245 Thus, the
BIA established that an individual seeking asylum based on his
membership in a particular social group must prove that his group
is (1) made up of members who share a common, immutable characteristic, (2) defined with sufficient particularity, and (3) socially
visible.246
The BIA then applied these requirements to the facts in the
case.247 The BIA did not clearly decide whether members of the
proposed social group first shared “a common, immutable characteristic.”248 Instead, it quickly turned to the second and third
requirements and held that the purported group did not satisfy either the “particularity” or “social visibility” standards.249
With respect to “particularity,” the BIA said, “the key question is
whether the proposed description is sufficiently ‘particular’ or is
‘too amorphous . . . to create a benchmark for determining group
membership.’”250 The BIA decided that the purported social group,
“Salvadoran youths who have resisted gang recruitment,” lacked
particularity because it “ma[de] up a potentially large and diffuse
segment of society.”251 It noted that the brothers tried “to limit or
define their proposed group by claiming that it [was] comprised of
male children who lack stable families and meaningful adult protection, who are from middle and low income classes, who live in the
territories controlled by the MS-13 gang, and who refuse recruitment.”252 But the BIA said “these characteristics remain amorphous
because ‘people’s ideas of what those terms mean can vary.’”253
244. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582 (emphasis added) (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
69 (BIA 2007) and In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006)).
245. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582; see also In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232–33 (BIA 2014)
(explaining its decision in Matter of S-E-G-).
246. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582–83.
247. See id. at 583–88.
248. See id. at 583–84.
249. Id. at 583 (“[W]e find that neither of the social groups proposed by the respondents
satisfies the standards of ‘particularity’ or ‘social visibility’ that we have recently explicated.”).
250. Id. at 584 (quoting Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008));
see also id. at 584 (saying that the relevant test “is whether the proposed group can accurately
be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the
society in question, as a discrete class of persons.”).
251. Id. at 585.
252. Id.
253. Id. (quoting Davila-Mejia, 531 F.3d at 629).
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Thus, the BIA concluded that the proposed social group was not
defined with sufficient particularity.254
With respect to “social visibility,” the BIA explained “that the
shared characteristic of the group should generally be recognizable
by others in the community.”255 Although the BIA acknowledged
that the brothers had been threatened and beaten by MS-13 gang
members, it said there was “little in the background evidence of
record to indicate that Salvadoran youth who are recruited by gangs
but refuse to join . . . would be ‘perceived as a group’ by society.”256
The BIA emphasized that “gang violence and crime in El Salvador
appear to be widespread, and the risk of harm is not limited to
young males who have resisted recruitment . . . but affects all segments of the population.”257 For that reason, the BIA said, “it is
difficult to conclude that any ‘group,’ as actually perceived by the
criminal gangs, is much narrower than the general population of El
Salvador.”258 The BIA then added that “[t]he respondents have provided no persuasive evidence, and we have no reason to believe,
that the general societal perception would be otherwise.”259 Therefore, the BIA concluded that the proposed social group was not
socially visible.260
Lastly, the BIA indicated that, even if “Salvadoran youths who
have resisted gang recruitment” were a cognizable social group, the
brothers still would not have been eligible for asylum because they
failed to show they were persecuted on account of their membership
in that group.261 The BIA conceded that “gangs such as the MS-13
retaliate against those who refuse to join their ranks.”262 But it
quickly added that “such gangs have directed harm against anyone
and everyone perceived to have interfered with, or who might present a threat to, their criminal enterprises and territorial power.”263
The BIA then stressed that the brothers had “not submitted evidence that persuades us that gangs commit violent acts for reasons
other than gaining more influence and power, and recruiting
254. Id.
255. Id. at 586. The BIA noted that it based this requirement, in part, on recent United
Nations Guidelines. See id. (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956 (BIA 2006), in turn
citing UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: “Membership of a Particular
Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002)).
256. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 588.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 587–88.
262. Id. at 587.
263. Id.
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young males to fill their ranks.”264 In other words, according to the
BIA, the brothers failed to show they were persecuted because of
their membership in a particular social group.265
In sum, Matter of S-E-G- established the modern definition of a
“particular social group”266 and rejected the notion that “Salvadoran youths who have resisted gang recruitment” constituted such a
group.267 The BIA also suggested that, even if the proposed group
were cognizable, there was no evidence that the respondents were
persecuted on account of their membership in that group.268 As a
result, Matter of S-E-G- started closing the doors to gang-related social group claims.269
The BIA continued to close those doors in Matter of E-A-G-.270
That case involved a young male who fled the MS-13 gang in Honduras, came to the United States, and applied for asylum.271 He
claimed that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of his membership in the particular social group of “persons resistant to gang membership.”272
The BIA quickly repeated the three requirements for a “particular social group”273 and rejected the notion that “persons resistant
to gang membership” constituted such a group.274 Plus, the BIA
again suggested that, even if the proposed group were cognizable,
there was no evidence that the respondent was persecuted on account of his membership in that group.275 Simply put, the BIA
continued to block gang-related social group claims.
264. Id. at 588.
265. See id. at 588; See also In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 250 (BIA 2014) (explaining
that, in Matter of S-E-G-, “[a]lthough . . . evidence of indiscriminate gang violence and strife
was largely dispositive of the applicant’s ability to establish the proposed group’s existence in
the society in question, it also undermined his attempt to establish a nexus between any past
or feared harm and a protected ground under the Act.”); Gupta, supra note 199, at 417–18
(discussing Matter of S-E-G- and recognizing that the BIA rejected the brothers’ asylum claim,
in part, “on nexus grounds”).
266. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 261–265 and accompanying text.
269. See Kniffin, supra note 51, at 327 (“[T]he BIA’s holding in Matter of S-E-G- has effectively shut the doors of the courthouse to all of the others fleeing the violence of MS-13 in El
Salvador, and other Central American countries.”).
270. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 591.
271. See id. at 591–93.
272. Id. at 593.
273. See id. at 594; see also In re M-E-V-G, I. & N. Dec. 227, 233 (BIA 2014) (recognizing
that, in In re E-A-G-, the BIA “reaffirm[ed] the requirements of Acosta and the additional
requirements of ‘particularity’ and ‘social visibility.’ ”).
274. See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594.
275. See id. at 595.
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After the BIA decided these cases, federal circuit courts generally
“deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of ‘particular social
group,’”276 and thus rejected proposed social groups involving
young people who had been recruited by gangs in the Northern
Triangle but refused to join.277
That said, a few circuits struck down the BIA’s social group requirements.278 Most notably, in an opinion written by Judge Posner,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the “social visibility” criterion.279 As
part of his analysis, Judge Posner said the “social visibility” requirement “makes no sense” because “[i]f you are a member of a group
that has been targeted for assassination or torture or some other
mode of persecution, you will take pains to avoid being socially visible.”280 For example, Judge Posner said, “A homosexual in a
homophobic society will pass as heterosexual.”281 Judge Posner then
said, “to the extent that the members of the target group are successful in remaining invisible, they will not be seen by other people
in the society as a segment of the population.”282 In short, Judge
Posner equated “social visibility” with “on-sight visibility,”283 and said
that when a person understandably tries to avoid persecution, the
“social visibility” criterion will unreasonably prevent him or her
from gaining asylum.284 For this and other reasons, Judge Posner
held that the BIA’s interpretation of “particular social group” was
not entitled to Chevron deference.285
Finally, in February 2014, in Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA responded to Judge Posner’s criticism by clarifying the meaning of
“social visibility.”286 While doing so, the BIA largely reaffirmed the
276. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1099 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
277. See, e.g., Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2012).
278. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009).
279. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16.
280. Id. at 615.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See id.; see also Kniffin, supra note 51, at 329 (recognizing that, according to Posner,
“the BIA’s ‘social visibility’ standard places an unreasonable and unrealistic burden on the
asylum applicant; it demands that the applicant place himself in increased danger by making
himself more visible to the general society in order to be eligible for asylum in the United
States.”).
285. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616. The Third Circuit also held that the BIA’s requirements
for a “particular social group” were not worthy of Chevron deference. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez
v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 603–09 (3d Cir. 2011). In Valdiviezo-Galdamez, however,
the Third Circuit largely relied on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Gatimi. See id. at 603–07
(repeatedly citing Gatimi).
286. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (BIA 2014).
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three requirements for a “particular social group.”287 As a result, the
BIA’s decisions continue to serve as a major roadblock to asylum for
young people fleeing gang recruitment in the Northern Triangle.

iv. Reaffirming the Three Requirements
Matter of M-E-V-G- involved a young Honduran male who fled MS13 because its members beat, kidnapped, and threatened him for
refusing to join the gang.288 Once the respondent arrived in the
United States, he applied for asylum, claiming he suffered past persecution on account of his membership in the particular social
group of “Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by
gangs but who have refused to join because they oppose the
gangs.”289
The BIA began its discussion by reviewing how its definition of
“particular social group” had evolved over time.290 While the BIA
said it wanted to “take this opportunity to clarify our interpretation
of the phrase ‘membership in a particular social group,’”291 it
stressed that it was “adher[ing] to the social group requirements
announced in Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-.”292 The BIA restated those requirements, saying, “[A]n applicant for asylum . . .
seeking relief based on ‘membership in a particular social group’
must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who
share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”293

287. See id. at 228 (“We adhere to our prior interpretations of the phrase.”).
288. See id.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 231–33.
291. Id. at 234.
292. Id. The BIA reiterated this point in a footnote, saying: “The Supreme Court has
stated that administrative agencies may adopt a new or changed interpretation as long as it is
based on a ‘reasoned explanation.’ FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16
(2009). Our decision in this case is not a new interpretation, but it further explains the
importance of particularity and social distinction as part of the statutory definition of the
phrase ‘particular social group.’ ” In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 234 n.9 (emphasis added).
293. Id. at 237.
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The BIA then described the first and second requirements as it
had in the past.294 That said, the BIA renamed the third requirement “social distinction.”295 It explained:
The primary source of disagreement with, or confusion about,
our prior interpretation of the term ‘particular social group’
relates to the social visibility requirement. Contrary to our intent, the term ‘social visibility’ has led some to believe that
literal, that is, ‘ocular’ or ‘on-sight,’ visibility is required to
make a particular social group cognizable under the Act. Because of that misconception, we now rename the ‘social
visibility’ requirement as ‘social distinction.’ This new name
more accurately describes the function of the requirement.296
Then, in an almost direct response to Judge Posner, the BIA
elaborated on the “social distinction” requirement, saying, “To be
socially distinct, a group need not be seen by society; rather, it must
be perceived by society. Society can consider persons to comprise a
group without being able to identify the group’s members on
sight.”297 The BIA explained, for example, that while “[i]t may not
be easy or possible to identify . . . who is homosexual, . . . a society
could still perceive . . . homosexuals . . . [as] a particular social
group for a host of reasons, such as sociopolitical or cultural conditions in the country.”298 Therefore, according to the BIA, “the fact
that members of a particular social group may make efforts to hide
their membership in the group to avoid persecution does not deprive the group of its protected status as a particular social
group.”299
Having addressed Judge Posner’s argument about on-sight visibility, the BIA emphasized that the “transition to the term ‘social
distinction’ . . . does not mark a departure from established principles.”300 The BIA summarized both Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A294. Indeed, with respect to the first requirement, the BIA said it was simply “incorporat[ing] the common immutable characteristic standard set forth in Matter of Acosta.”
Id. (citation omitted). And with respect to the second requirement, the BIA reiterated that
the “particular social group must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group.” Id. at 239 (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24
I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (BIA 2007)).
295. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236.
296. Id. at 236 (citations and footnote omitted).
297. Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
298. Id.
299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
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G-301 and, in an obvious blow to the respondent’s case, said it
“would reach the same result in [those cases] if we were to apply
the term ‘social distinction’ rather than ‘social visibility.’”302 The
BIA seemed to further tip its hand by adding that “[a] national
community may struggle with significant societal problems resulting
from gangs, but not all societal problems are bases for asylum.”303
In the end, however, the BIA acknowledged that its past decisions were not blanket rejections of all gang-based asylum claims,
and it conceded that “[s]ocial group determinations are made on a
case-by-case basis.”304 Therefore, since the respondent asked for a
remand, and DHS said it did not oppose that request, the BIA remanded the case to the immigration court for further factfinding.305
In sum, although the BIA did not categorically reject the respondent’s asylum application, it embraced Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of
E-A-G- and reaffirmed the three requirements for a “particular social group.” As a result, young people fleeing gang recruitment in
the Northern Triangle will continue to have a difficult time gaining
asylum on a social group theory.306

b. Political Opinion
Although most gang-related asylum cases center on social group
claims, some also involve political opinion claims.307 Indeed, young
people who refused to join gangs sometimes allege persecution in
their home countries on account of an anti-gang political opinion.308 In order to qualify for asylum on account of a political
opinion, a person must establish two key elements.309 First, he must
show that he holds, or his persecutors at least believe he holds, a
political opinion.310 Second, he must show that he was or will be
301. See id., at 249–51.
302. Id. at 247.
303. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 252.
306. See also ANKER, supra note 201, § 5:25 (“[Particular social groups] based on resistance
or opposition [to the maras] have met with limited success especially given the Board’s imposition of social visibility (now ‘social distinction’. . . .) and particularity criteria onto the
established [particular social group] framework.”).
307. See Blake, supra note 208, at 36 (“A lesser-discussed ground for making gang-related
asylum claims . . . is the ‘political opinion’ ground.”).
308. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
309. See ANKER, supra note 201, § 5:25.
310. See id.
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persecuted because of that opinion.311 This latter requirement is
known as the “nexus” requirement.312 Ultimately, individuals who
resisted gang recruitment have trouble establishing these
elements.313
The Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias is illustrative.314 In that case, eighteen-year-old Elias-Zacarias refused to join
an armed guerilla group in Guatemala.315 Instead, he fled to the
United States and applied for asylum.316 Eventually, the Ninth Circuit held that Elias-Zacarias had a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of a political opinion and, therefore, was
eligible for asylum.317
The Supreme Court granted certiorari318 and reversed.319 The
Court first recognized that a person might resist recruitment in a
guerilla movement “for a variety of reasons—fear of combat, a desire to remain with one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a
better living in civilian life, to mention only a few.”320 The Court
then emphasized that there was no evidence that Elias-Zacarias’s
refusal to join the guerillas was based on a political opinion he
held.321 In fact, the Court said that the evidence “showed the opposite” since Elias-Zacarias “testified that he refused to join the
guerillas because he was afraid the government would retaliate
against him and his family if he did so.”322 The Court also said there
was no “indication . . . that the guerrillas erroneously believed that
Elias-Zacarias’ refusal was politically based.”323 Simply put, EliasZacarias failed to establish either an actual or imputed political
opinion.324
The Court then added that even if Elias-Zacarias had shown he
held an anti-gang political opinion, he still failed to put forth any
311. See id.
312. See id. § 5:1 (noting that “ ‘nexus’ . . . [refers to] the requirement of a link between
the persecution suffered or feared and the particular ground of persecution.”).
313. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–84 (1992); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 591, 596–97 (BIA July 30, 2008); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 588–90 (BIA
2008).
314. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
315. Id. at 479.
316. Id. at 480.
317. See id. (citing Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 850–52).
318. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 915 (1991).
319. Id. at 478, 484 (1992) (“The BIA’s determination should . . . have been upheld in all
respects, and we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the contrary.”).
320. Id. at 482.
321. Id. (“The record in the present case . . . failed to show a political motive on EliasZacarias’ part.”).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See id.
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evidence “that the guerillas [were going to] persecute him because of
that political opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight
with them.”325 In short, Elias-Zacarias also failed to meet the nexus
requirement.326 Therefore, the Court held that Elias-Zacarias was
not eligible for asylum.327
Although the Court decided Elias-Zacarias more than two decades ago, the BIA still applies the Court’s analysis to deny political
asylum claims made by youth fleeing gang recruitment in the
Northern Triangle.328 For example, in Matter of S-E-G-, the case involving the sixteen-year-old brothers who fled MS-13’s forced
recruitment efforts in El Salvador, the BIA cited Elias-Zacarias329 and
rejected the brothers’ argument that MS-13 persecuted them “on
account of their anti-gang political opinion.”330
Drawing on the Court’s analysis in Elias-Zacarias,331 the BIA first
said that the brothers “failed to show a political motive in resisting
gang recruitment. . . . Indeed, there is no evidence in the record
that the respondents were politically active or made any anti-gang
political statements.”332 In other words, the brothers “did not establish what political opinion, if any, they held.”333 The BIA also noted
that the brothers “provided no evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that the MS-13 gang in El Salvador imputed, or would impute to
them, an anti-gang political opinion.”334 Thus, like the respondent
in Elias-Zacarias, the brothers failed to establish either an actual or
imputed political opinion.335
The BIA then added that even if the brothers had shown they
held an anti-gang political opinion, they still failed to put forth any
evidence “that the gang persecuted or would persecute them on the
325. Id. at 483.
326. See id. at 483–84.
327. See id. at 484 (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of asylum).
328. See Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 596–97 (BIA 2008); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 579, 588–90 (BIA 2008).
329. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 588 (“Given the circumstances of this case, we find that the
respondents’ argument is foreclosed by INS v. Elias-Zacarias.”).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 589 (“We conclude that the Court’s analysis in Elias-Zacarias is applicable to
this case.”).
332. Id.
333. Id. These statements indicate that simply refusing to join a gang, without more, is
not enough to establish a political opinion. Other commentators have recognized this point.
See, e.g., Lindsay M. Harris & Morgan M. Weibel, Matter of S-E-G-: The Final Nail in the Coffin
for Gang-Related Asylum Claims?, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 5, 9 (2010) (“[The BIA’s] reasoning
suggests that only those who put themselves in more danger, by openly criticizing dangerous
gangs, will be eligible for asylum based on their political opinion.”).
334. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 589.
335. See id.
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basis of such opinion.”336 The BIA stressed that there was “no indication that the MS-13 gang members who pursued the respondents
had any motives other than increasing the size and influence of
their gang.”337 In short, the brothers also failed to meet the nexus
requirement.338 Therefore, the BIA held that they were not eligible
for asylum.339
Similarly, in Matter of E-A-G-, the case involving the young male
who fled MS-13 in Honduras, the BIA again relied on EliasZacarias340 to reject a respondent’s political opinion asylum claim.341
Once more, the BIA held that the respondent failed to establish
either an actual or imputed political opinion,342 and failed to show
that he was or would be persecuted because of that opinion.343
Thus, the BIA held that the respondent was not eligible for
asylum.344
In short, Elias-Zacarias, Matter of S-E-G-, and Matter of E-A-G- all
reaffirm the rule that, in order to make out a political opinion asylum claim, a person must establish that he holds, or his persecutors
at least believe he holds, a political opinion,345 and that he was or
will be persecuted because of that opinion.346 More importantly, all
three cases show that individuals who have resisted gang recruitment struggle to meet these elements.347
It is true that, despite the foregoing cases, a person’s refusal to
join a gang could still give rise to a political opinion asylum
claim.348 After all, the case law “does not stand for the proposition
that opposition to forced recruitment cannot constitute a political
opinion.”349 Rather, it simply provides “that refusal to join does not
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See id.
339. See id. at 590 (“[T]he respondents failed to demonstrate that they were persecuted
or fear persecution on account of their political opinion and . . . they therefore did not
establish eligibility for asylum.”).
340. Id. at 597 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).
341. Id. at 596 (“We . . . disagree with the Immigration Judge’s determination that the
respondent faces persecution in Honduras on account of his political opinion.”).
342. See id. at 596–97.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 597 (“[W]e disagree with the Immigration Judge . . . that the respondent
would be subject to persecution on account of his political opinion by gangs in Honduras.”).
345. See also supra notes 321–324, 332–335, 342 and accompanying text.
346. See also supra notes 325–326, 336–338, 343 and accompanying text.
347. See also supra notes 319–344 and accompanying text.
348. See ANKER, supra note 201, § 5:25 (“The [Elias-Zacarias] Court only stated that refusal
to join does not necessarily constitute a political opinion. . . . [T]he Court did not hold that
in all cases such refusal to take a stance was apolitical.” (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 481–83 (1992))).
349. Id. (emphasis added).
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necessarily constitute a political opinion.”350 Nevertheless, for an individual to be eligible for political asylum based on his or her
refusal to join a gang, that person still must show that his or her
“resistance flows from [a] political conviction or one that the applicant is assumed to have,”351 and also that he or she has been or will
be persecuted because of that actual or imputed opinion.352 In
many cases, asylum applicants lack such evidence.353 Thus, many
young people fleeing gang recruitment in the Northern Triangle
will have a difficult time gaining asylum on a political opinion
theory.

c. Conclusions Regarding Asylum Claims
In sum, the most common asylum claims made by children refusing to join gangs are that they have been or will be persecuted back
home (1) because of their membership in the particular social
group of youth who have been recruited by gangs but refused to
join, and/or (2) because of their anti-gang political opinion.354
However, the BIA and federal courts have largely rejected these
claims. Ultimately, as Stephen Yale-Loehr put it, there is “armor
against granting asylum to those who resist induction into gangs.”355

2. Other Forms of Relief from Removal
Although asylum is the main form of relief available to individuals fleeing humanitarian crises, the children from the Northern
Triangle may also apply for other forms of relief from removal.
These include protection under the Convention Against Torture,
visas for victims of human trafficking or other crimes, and special
immigrant juvenile status.356 However, each of these forms of relief
350. Id. (emphasis added).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See Diane Uchimiya, Falling Through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties in Current
Asylum Jurisprudence, 23 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 109, 149 (2013) (“Applicants in gang-based
asylum cases who allege persecution on account of political opinion have generally been
denied asylum for lack of supporting evidence.”).
354. See supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text.
355. Miriam Jordan, Family Seeks U.S. Asylum After Fleeing Gang, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2009,
at A3 (quoting Professor Yale-Loehr).
356. Lisa Frydman and her colleagues first analyzed each of these forms of relief in great
detail in their 2014 report. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 24–25, 37–53. In doing so,
they emphasized the numerous challenges that unaccompanied children face in trying to
gain these protections. See id. at 24–25, 38–45, 48–53. Since Frydman and her colleagues
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is relatively narrow and appears unlikely to protect large numbers
of children.357
To begin, many children will likely struggle to gain protection
under the Convention Against Torture.358 A person applying for
such protection bears the heavy burden of proving “that it is more
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the
proposed country of removal.”359 The person must also show that
this torture will be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting
in an official capacity.”360 Thus, as the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies and Kids in Need of Defense recognize in their joint
report, the burden of proof in these cases is especially high with
respect to “the likelihood [of harm], type of harm, and State action
required to establish eligibility.”361 As a result, it is unlikely that
large numbers of children will receive relief under the Convention
Against Torture.362
Many children may also have a challenging time obtaining visas
for victims of human trafficking or other crimes.363 As an initial
matter, many children may be unable to obtain T visas.364 This is
because the 5,000 T visas available each year365 are specifically reserved for victims of sex or labor trafficking,366 and many of the
children from the Northern Triangle do not fall into either of these
released their groundbreaking report, other prominent scholars have built upon their work.
See, e.g., Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 35, at 35 (examining special immigrant juvenile status and T and U nonimmigrant status).
357. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 54 (“Existing humanitarian relief . . . benefit[s] only a small percentage of children. . . . [C]hild applicants face significant barriers to
being granted the primary forms of humanitarian relief,” including asylum, protection under
the Convention Against Torture, special immigrant juvenile status, and visas for victims of
human trafficking or other crimes.).
358. See id. at 24 (“[W]inning [Convention Against Torture] protection [is] especially
difficult for children.”).
359. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2015).
360. Id. at § 208.18(a)(1).
361. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 24. Frydman and her colleagues also argue that
“the absence of guidance regarding how to analyze [Convention Against Torture] claims for
children” is part of the reason why “winning [Convention Against Torture] protection [is]
especially difficult for children.” Id.
362. See id. at 54 (“Of the 28 [Convention Against Torture] determinations reviewed for
this study at the [Immigration Judge] and [Board of Immigration Appeals] levels, only three
resulted in [Convention Against Torture] grants.”).
363. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 48 (“Despite the major advance represented by
these new forms of protection, challenges to obtaining T and U visas still remain in children’s cases . . . .”). That said, if a child is granted one of these visas, he or she could
potentially become a lawful permanent resident within a small number of years. See MARTIN
ET AL., supra note 194, at 983–84.
364. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2012).
365. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 983.
366. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 7102).
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categories despite fleeing horrific gang violence.367 And while a
number of children from the Northern Triangle are victims of trafficking,368 it can be difficult for law enforcement officials to identify
these individuals.369 Therefore, some children may not obtain T
visas even if they are otherwise eligible.
Many children will also be unable to obtain U visas.370 10,000 U
visas are available each year “for individuals who ‘have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse’ as victims of a broad list of
crimes.”371 However, the crime at issue must have “violated the laws
of the United States or occurred in the United States.”372 Moreover,
the applicant must obtain a certificate373 confirming that he or she
“has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to a
Federal, State, or local law enforcement official . . . investigating or
prosecuting [the] criminal activity.”374 Since most of the unaccompanied children are fleeing widespread gang violence in areas more
than 1,000 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border, it is unlikely that
many of them will obtain this form of relief.
Finally, many children may have a difficult time gaining special
immigrant juvenile status (SIJS),375 a form of relief that would allow
them to become a lawful permanent resident of the United
States.376 In order to qualify for SIJS under federal law, a child must
follow “a two-step process.”377 First, the child “must obtain an order
from a state court declaring (1) that they are dependent on the
court; (2) that they have been abused, abandoned, or neglected;
and (3) that it is not in their best interest to return to their home
country.”378 Second, once the state court issues the order, “the child
367. See UNHCR CHILDREN ON THE RUN REPORT, supra note 19, at 27 (showing that the
children are fleeing many different types of gang violence).
368. See Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 35, at 35 (“The increasing involvement of
organized crime groups and some street gangs in forms of human trafficking suggests that
many newly arrived [unaccompanied alien children] could be eligible for T visas.”).
369. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 48 (arguing that there are “[i]nadequacies in
screening for trafficking victims”); see id. at 50 (claiming that there is a “need for better
training of community actors to identify victims of trafficking.”).
370. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U).
371. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 984 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)).
372. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(IV).
373. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 984.
374. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III); see also FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 51 (discussing the “[d]ifficulties in obtaining law enforcement certification in U cases.”).
375. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 38 (“While the number of children seeking
SIJS has increased . . . the overall number of children likely to be eligible for SIJS and identified to pursue it remains low.”).
376. See id. at 37 (recognizing that SIJS “confers a visa status that leads to immediate
permanent residency”).
377. BYRNE & MILLER, supra note 151, at 26.
378. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (providing these requirements).
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may petition [DHS] for special immigrant juvenile status and, simultaneously, for adjustment of status to legal permanent
residency.”379
At first glance, SIJS appears to be a promising form of relief for
which unaccompanied children fleeing gang violence could apply.
To be sure, numerous children from the Northern Triangle appear
eligible for this lasting type of relief.380 However, as Lisa Frydman
and her colleagues point out, “there remain challenges for children
attempting to obtain this form of protection.”381
As an initial matter, many children are simply unaware that they
may qualify for SIJS because they lack legal representation.382 Moreover, children often face multiple hurdles when trying to complete
step one of the SIJS process—obtaining the required state court
order.383 First, state court judges are often unfamiliar with SIJS,384
confused about their role in the process,385 or concerned that they
lack the legal authority to issue an order an individual can use to
obtain an immigration benefit from the federal government.386 Second, the state court judge simply may not agree with the child that
379. BYRNE & MILLER, supra note 151, at 26; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (stating
that “the Secretary of Homeland Security” must “consent[ ] to the grant of special immigrant
juvenile status”).
380. See Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 35, at 35 (“Data . . . suggest that a large
number of recent child arrivals could be eligible for classification as special immigrant
juveniles. In recent years, between 15 and 30 percent of [unaccompanied alien children]
referrals applied for [special immigrant juvenile] status, with high approval rates.”). Several
nonprofit organizations, including the highly-regarded Safe Passage Project, help unaccompanied children obtain special immigrant juvenile status, among other forms of relief. See
SAFE PASSAGE PROJECT, http://www.safepassageproject.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
381. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 38.
382. See id. (“Children in removal proceedings who have legal counsel to represent them
stand a good chance of being identified and obtaining SIJS if eligible; however, the majority
of children still lack legal counsel.”); see also supra notes 173–185 and accompanying text
(recognizing that most unaccompanied children are not represented by a lawyer and discussing how the lack of counsel reduces a child’s chances of obtaining relief from removal).
383. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 40 (“SIJS petititoners also encounter hesitancy
in some state courts to grant a ‘predicate order’ with the findings required for a grant of SIJS
status.”).
384. See id. at 140 (“SIJS is still new to some state courts. Even with courts that are familiar
with SIJS, there are often new judges who do not have experience with this status.”).
385. See id. (“Some state court judges are confused by the federal immigration laws related to SIJS. . . . Specifically, some state court judges do not understand that granting the
special findings does not mean the judge is granting an immigration benefit.”); id. at 40
n.204 (“Some judges . . . have been hesitant to grant SIJS findings because they feel they are
circumventing the immigration laws or that these findings are an issue for the immigration
authorities.”).
386. See id. at 40 (“Some state court judges . . . are unaware that they have the authority to
grant the special findings. . . . Some of these judges express concern that they are stepping
outside of their prescribed role in making the required findings.”); id. at 40 n.203 (“Judges in
one county have indicated that they do not believe they have the authority to issue SIJS
findings and want to hear from an Immigration Judge on this question. Some judges in other
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he or she has been abused, abandoned, or neglected as the relevant
term is defined under that state’s law.387 Finally, the state court
judge may also disagree with the child’s claim that it is not in his or
her best interest to be returned to the Northern Triangle; after all,
this is a subjective determination that requires the balancing of several different factors.388 In short, these challenges and others389 will
make it difficult for many children to obtain SIJS.
*

*

*

In conclusion, this Part examined the main forms of relief from
removal available to individuals fleeing humanitarian crises. It focused on asylum, but also briefly considered protection under the
Convention Against Torture, visas for victims of human trafficking
or other crimes, and special immigrant juvenile status. Ultimately,
many of the children from the Northern Triangle will have a difficult time gaining these protections.390 Therefore, these children are
at serious risk of being deported and facing the same fate as Benito
Zaldı́var.

III. AN ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION

TO THE

INTERSECTING CRISES

This problem demands an immediate solution because children
are being deported to the Northern Triangle and subsequently
murdered.391 Indeed, the Los Angeles Times reported that gangs in
Honduras recently killed children who were deported from the
United States.392 In the report, Hector Hernandez, a morgue operator in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, said, “There are many youngsters
counties have at least initially refused to make the special findings due to their belief that
they do not have the authority to do so.”).
387. See ANGIE JUNCK ET AL., SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS AND OTHER IMMIGRATION
OPTIONS FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH § 3.2, 3-7 (4th ed., Immigrant Legal Resource Center
2014) (recognizing that the terms “[a]buse, neglect, and abandonment are defined under
the relevant state law”).
388. See id. § 3.2, 3-8 (discussing the various factors relevant to this determination).
389. See FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 38–45 (discussing other challenges that children face in trying to obtain SIJS and offering a series of recommendations in response to
these challenges).
390. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
391. See Cindy Carcamo, In Honduras, U.S. Deportees Seek to Journey North Again, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-honduras-deportedyouths-20140816-story.html.
392. See id.
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who only three days after they’ve been deported are killed, shot by
a firearm. . . . They return just to die.”393
Given this situation, the Obama administration should provide
temporary humanitarian protection to these migrants by exercising
its congressionally delegated power to designate El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as new “temporary protected status” (TPS)
countries.394 Under this proposal, the United States would provide
a temporary safe haven to nationals of these three countries until
the horrific gang violence in the Northern Triangle subsides.
This Part makes the case for that administrative action.395 It begins by reviewing the law regarding TPS and the history of TPS
designations.396 It then argues that the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security should designate El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras as new TPS countries due to the humanitarian crisis
involving MS-13 and M-18.397 After all, the violence between these
gangs constitutes an “ongoing armed conflict,” one of the criteria
for designating foreign states TPS countries.398 At the very least, the
violence perpetrated by MS-13 and M-18 represents other “extraordinary and temporary conditions” in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras that prevent nationals of these countries from returning in safety, and that also justifies fresh TPS designations.399
Moreover, designating the Northern Triangle countries for TPS
would be in line with prior designations.400 It would also be consistent with the purpose of the TPS statute, which is to temporarily
protect individuals who have fled humanitarian crises in their home
countries and are now in the United States facing the legal crisis of
being ineligible for relief from removal.401 This Part concludes that
the United States should provide a temporary safe haven to nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras until the violence
subsides in these countries.
393. Id. The report adds that, according to Hernandez, “[a]t least five, perhaps as many
as 10, of the 42 children slain [in San Pedro Sula, Honduras] since February [2014] had
been recently deported from the U.S.” Id.
394. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b) (2012) (regarding TPS designations).
395. As the Introduction recognizes, other scholars and commentators have also recently
called on the U.S. government to issue new TPS designations for the Northern Triangle
countries. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. This piece builds on that previous work,
and it is the first law review article to make the comprehensive case for TPS as the right
response to the intersecting humanitarian and legal crises confronting so many migrants
from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
396. See infra Part III.A.
397. See infra Part III.B.
398. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A).
399. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C).
400. See infra notes 463–69 and accompanying text.
401. See infra notes 456–459 and accompanying text.
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A. Temporary Protected Status
In 1990, Congress added provisions to the INA regarding TPS.402
Today, INA § 244(b)(1) provides that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security may designate a foreign state as a TPS
country for a variety of reasons.403 Indeed, a TPS designation is appropriate if the Secretary finds that (A) there is an “ongoing armed
conflict” in the foreign country that would pose a serious threat to
returning nationals;404 (B) there has been an environmental disaster in the foreign state and, as a result, the country is temporarily
unable to adequately handle the return of its nationals;405 or (C)
there exists other “extraordinary and temporary conditions” in the
foreign state that would prevent its nationals from returning
safely.406
The TPS process involves two main steps.407 First, the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security designates a foreign state as
a TPS country pursuant to the foregoing statutory criteria.408 The
Secretary may issue this initial designation for any period of time
between six and eighteen months.409 The Secretary is then permitted to extend the TPS designation if the foreign state continues to
meet the conditions for designation.410 Notably, the Secretary’s

402. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. For a succinct discussion of the historical precursors to TPS, see
MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 949–51.
403. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)–(C). Congress initially delegated this power to the
Attorney General. See Pub. L. No. 101-649 (1990). But in 2002, Congress transferred this
authority to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
404. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A).
405. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(B).
406. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C).
407. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 951 (describing TPS as “a two-step process” and
then articulating both steps).
408. Id. (“First, the Secretary of Homeland Security designates a country . . . whose citizens are eligible to receive temporary protection in the United States.”).
409. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(2)(B) (“For purposes of this section, the initial period of
designation of a foreign state . . . is the period, specified by the [Secretary], of not less than 6
months and not more than 18 months.”).
410. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(3)(A) (“At least 60 days before end of the initial period of designation . . . of a foreign state . . . the [Secretary], after consultation with appropriate agencies
of the Government, shall review the conditions in the foreign state . . . and shall determine
whether the conditions for such designation . . . continue to be met.”); see also 8?U.S.C.
§ 1254a(b)(3)(C) (“If the [Secretary] does not determine . . . that a foreign state . . . no
longer meets the conditions for designation . . . , the period of designation of the foreign
state is extended for an additional period of 6 months (or, in the discretion of the [Secretary], a period of 12 or 18 months).”).
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decisions to issue an initial designation, extend a designation, or
terminate a designation are not subject to judicial review.411
Second, as a general matter, nationals of a designated country
who have been continuously physically present and residing in the
United States since the date of the designation may seek TPS by
filing an application with the Department of Homeland Security.412
That said, certain individuals are not eligible for TPS.413 This includes, but is not limited to, non-citizens who have “been convicted
of any felony or 2 or more misdemeanors committed in the United
States,”414 persecuted others,415 or engaged in terrorist activity.416
Ultimately, if the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security designates a foreign state as a TPS country, and an eligible
individual applies for and receives temporary protection, then that
person is not removable from the United States while the designation is in place.417 The individual may also obtain authorization to
work in the United States,418 which will “be effective throughout the
period that the [person] is in temporary protected status.”419 Finally, the TPS beneficiary may be permitted to travel abroad
without losing his or her status.420
Over the past twenty-five years, the executive branch issued numerous TPS designations “in situations ranging from civil war to
environmental disaster to disruptions to the home country.”421 For
411. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (“There is no judicial review of any determination of
the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation,
of a foreign state under this subsection.”).
412. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 951 (“Second, individuals within the designated
group who are in the United States may apply for protection, according to statutorily prescribed procedures.”). For the precise eligibility requirements for TPS, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a(c) (discussing which “aliens [are] eligible for temporary protected status”). For a
discussion of the TPS application process, see Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforced-departure/temporary-protected-status (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) [hereinafter
USCIS Information Regarding TPS].
413. For a complete list of those individuals who are and are not eligible for TPS, see
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2) and USCIS Information Regarding TPS, supra note 412.
414. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i).
415. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(ii) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)).
416. See id.
417. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A) (“In the case of an alien who is a national of a foreign
state designated [for TPS] . . . , the [Secretary] . . . may grant the alien temporary protected
status in the United States and shall not remove the alien from the United States during the
period in which such status is in effect.”).
418. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(B) (“[T]he [Secretary] . . . shall authorize the alien to
engage in employment in the United States and provide the alien with an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit.”).
419. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(2).
420. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(3) (“During a period in which an alien is granted temporary
protected status . . . the alien may travel abroad with the prior consent of the [Secretary].”).
421. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 952.
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example, the government issued TPS designations to Kuwait,
Rwanda, and Sudan because of armed conflicts in those countries;
Haiti, Montserrat, and Nicaragua because of environmental disasters; and even Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone because of the
extraordinary and temporary conditions in those countries related
to the rapid spread of Ebola.422 These are just a few of the countries
that have been designated for TPS.423 In total, since 1990, the
United States has granted TPS to hundreds of thousands of foreign
nationals who have fled humanitarian crises across the globe.424

B. Designating the Northern Triangle Countries
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should
now issue new TPS designations for El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras due to the humanitarian crisis caused by the MS-13 and
M-18 gangs.
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that El Salvador
and Honduras are already on the current list of TPS-designated
countries.425 The government first designated Honduras for TPS in
January 1999 after “Hurricane Mitch swept through Central
America causing severe flooding and associated damage.”426 The
government then designated El Salvador for TPS in March 2001
after that country suffered a series of devastating earthquakes.427
Since making these initial designations, the government has repeatedly extended TPS for both countries up through the present
day.428 In fact, the government has extended TPS for Honduras at
least twelve times and El Salvador at least ten times.429 The Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security insists that “the conditions in Honduras that prompted the [initial] TPS designation”
422. See Temporary Protected Status, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status#top (last visited Oct. 12,
2015).
423. For a complete list of the countries that have been designated for TPS since Congress added section 244 to the INA, see id.
424. See id.
425. See id.; see also Hershberg & Rathod, supra note 35 (“Honduras and El Salvador are
on the list of current TPS designees, from when natural disasters affected the countries in
1999 and 2001, respectively.”)
426. Designation of Honduras Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 64 Fed. Reg.
524 (Jan. 5, 1999).
427. See Designation of El Salvador Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 66 Fed.
Reg. 14,214 (March 9, 2001).
428. See Temporary Protected Status, supra note 422.
429. See id.
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more than sixteen years ago “continue to be met.”430 Similarly, the
Secretary claims that “the disruption in living conditions in affected
areas of El Salvador resulting from the environmental disaster that
prompted the [initial] designation” more than fourteen years ago
persists in 2015.431
Although the government extended TPS for both Honduras and
El Salvador many times, these extensions only benefit those “persons already in the United States as of the date of [the initial]
designation”432—that is, as of January 1999 in the case of Honduras
and March 2001 in the case of El Salvador. This is because, under
the law, “[a]n extension of TPS . . . at the expiration of an initial
designation period merely allows the original group of beneficiaries, already present in the United States as of the original cutoff
date, to stay for the added period.”433 Thus, the TPS extensions for
Honduras and El Salvador do not help the numerous young migrants who recently fled the gang violence in the Northern Triangle
and traveled to the southern border.434 In order for these individuals to be protected, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security would have to “redesignate” Honduras and El Salvador as
TPS countries, advancing “the cut-off date . . . [and] shielding all
nationals of [these countries] who are present [in the United
States] as of the redesignation.”435 The Secretary would also have to
designate Guatemala as a TPS country for the first time.
The Secretary should issue these new designations promptly. The
violence between MS-13 and M-18 certainly constitutes an “ongoing
armed conflict,” one of the statutory criteria for designating foreign
states TPS countries.436 The modern evidence makes this clear437—
especially the latest reporting on the Northern Triangle. For example, a recent Time magazine article about El Salvador stressed that
“[w]arring gangs have turned the country into one of the world’s
deadliest places.”438 The article explained that MS-13 and M-18
430. Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed.
Reg. 62,170 (Oct. 16, 2014).
431. Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 80 Fed.
Reg. 894 (Jan. 7, 2015).
432. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 952.
433. Id. at 955–56 (discussing the Immigration and Nationality Act).
434. See Hershberg & Rathod, supra note 35 (“Since TPS applies only to those foreign
nationals in the U.S. as of the date of designation, migrants who arrived subsequently cannot
apply.”)
435. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 956.
436. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A) (2012).
437. See supra Part I.B (discussing the modern situation involving MS-13 and M-18 in the
Northern Triangle).
438. See Ioan Grillo, El Salvador’s Kill Zone, TIME, July 23, 2015, http://time.com/39692
32/el-salvadors-kill-zone/.
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“fight each other for control of territory so that they can expand
their extortion rackets, trade in drugs and engage in other forms of
organized crime. But gang members also murder their rivals simply
to raise their status within their own gang, which helps perpetuate
the conflict.”439 Similarly, a New York Times piece emphasized that,
in Honduras, the gangs continue to “battle for turf, with the
borderlines of their territory the most lethal.”440 Finally, a report
issued for the U.S. Department of Justice attributes Guatemala’s extremely high levels of violence to MS-13 and M-18, which are
engaged in “turf wars” and “use lethal violence against” each
other.441
The U.S. Department of State’s latest descriptions of conditions
in the Northern Triangle also support the claim that the region is
overrun by violent gangs involved in an “ongoing armed conflict.”
Indeed, the State Department recently emphasized that there are
“thousands of known gang members” in the Northern Triangle who
are armed and “quick to engage in violence or use deadly force if
resisted.”442 The State Department also said that, in addition to controlling territory,443 the gangs “are known to commit crimes such as
murder, kidnapping, extortion, carjacking, armed robbery, rape,
and other aggravated assaults.”444 As Harvard Law Professor
Deborah Anker recently put it, “Central America is a war zone more
violent than the days of the civil wars.”445 In short, the situation in
the Northern Triangle constitutes an “ongoing armed conflict,”
and therefore it justifies fresh TPS designations.
It is true that the executive branch has historically designated
countries for TPS on the basis of an “ongoing armed conflict” when
those countries were experiencing a civil war. For example, in 2004,
439. Id.
440. Randal C. Archibold, Hope Dwindles for Hondurans Living in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2014, at A1.
441. GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., GUATEMALA GANG VIOLENCE, LL NO. 2012-008434, 1–2
(2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/gang_violence
2013_0.pdf (internal citations and quotations omitted).
442. El Salvador Travel Warning, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June
22, 2015), http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/el-salvadortravel-warning.html [hereinafter June 2015 El Salvador Travel Warning]; see also id. (noting
that “[t]hese ‘maras’ concentrate on . . . arms trafficking, murder for hire, . . . and violent
street crime,” among other things).
443. See id. (pointing out that victims of crime sometimes “unwittingly wander into gangcontrolled territory.” (emphasis added)).
444. Honduras Travel Warning, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar.
2, 2015), http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/honduras-travelwarning.html [hereinafter March 2015 Honduras Travel Warning].
445. See Cindy Chang & Kate Linthicum, U.S. Seeing a Surge in Central American Asylum
Seekers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/15/local/la-me-ffasylum-20131215.
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the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security said he was
redesignating Sudan for TPS because “the North-South civil war
continues without a comprehensive peace agreement to end the
civil war,” and thus “[t]he armed conflict in Sudan continues.”446
Similarly, in 2013, when the Secretary redesignated Syria for TPS
on account of “the ongoing armed conflict” in that country, she
emphasized the fact that “the International Committee of the Red
Cross labeled the Syrian conflict a civil war.”447 Since the conflict
between the MS-13 and M-18 gangs is not obviously a civil war, it
might seem inappropriate to designate the Northern Triangle
states for TPS because of an “ongoing armed conflict” in those
countries.
However, the TPS statute does not define “ongoing armed conflict” as a civil war,448 and the legislative history actually suggests that
the phrase should be interpreted broadly. In fact, when the TPS
statute was first proposed in the House of Representatives, the accompanying report said that the legislation created a framework for
providing temporary protection to individuals fleeing a variety of
situations, including “generalized violence . . . in their home country.”449 The report later echoed this point by indicating that the TPS
statute would allow the executive branch to provide temporary protection to individuals fleeing, among other things, “a generalized state
of violence.”450 Then, shortly before the statute was enacted, one of
the drafters in the Senate explained that, under the new law, “[a]
clear policy is established for granting temporary safe haven to foreign nationals unable to return safely to their native countries
because of violence.”451 These statements show that Congress meant
for the phrase “ongoing armed conflict” to include situations like
the unprecedented gang violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras.452
446. Extension and Re-designation of Temporary Protected Status for Sudan, 69 Fed.
Reg. 60,168-01 (Oct. 7, 2004).
447. Extension and Redesignation of Syria for Temporary Protected Status, 78 Fed. Reg.
36,223 (June 17, 2013).
448. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012).
449. H.R. REP. NO. 101-245, at 6 (1989) (emphasis added). As the BIA has explained,
“[t]he general TPS statutory scheme set forth in H.R. 2929, the Chinese Temporary Protected Status Act of 1989, was later enacted with similar language as part of the Immigration
Act of 1990.” Matter of Ventura, 25 I. & N. Dec. 391, 394 n.6 (BIA 2010).
450. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-245, at 8–9 (1989) (emphasis added).
451. 136 CONG. REC. S17,106-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(emphasis added).
452. Professors Hershberg and Rathod point out in their commentary in Roll Call that
some “international law experts have analogized the situation in the northern triangle to a
conventional armed conflict.” See Hershberg & Rathod, supra note 35 (emphasis added). However, such an analogy is not needed to support new TPS designations because the phrase
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Even if the humanitarian crisis in the Northern Triangle does
not constitute an “ongoing armed conflict,” the violence perpetrated by MS-13 and M-18 represents other “extraordinary and
temporary conditions” preventing nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras from safely returning to their countries.453
This also justifies fresh TPS designations.454 Although the TPS statute does not define “extraordinary and temporary conditions,”455
the legislative history appears to equate the phrase with “unsettled
conditions”456 and “upheaval.”457 The situation in the Northern Triangle clearly meets these standards.458 After all, the State
Department has recognized that the region is awash in gang violence and the police in the Northern Triangle are largely unable to
control the gangs.459 In fact, the State Department has repeatedly
said that most serious crimes committed in the region are never
solved.460 Thus, conditions in the Northern Triangle are obviously
unsettled, as the gangs have created extraordinary turmoil and prevented nationals of the region from returning safely. This is
precisely why the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should issue new TPS designations for El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras.
Designating these countries for TPS would also be in line with
prior designations. With the highest murder rates in the world,461
“ongoing armed conflict” should be interpreted broadly to encompass even an unconventional
ongoing armed conflict, like the current situation in the Northern Triangle.
453. See also id. (“The unique mix of debilitating conditions, framed by ineffective governance and ubiquitous violence surely constitute the type of ‘extraordinary’ conditions
contemplated by the statute.”).
454. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C).
455. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a.
456. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-245, at 6 (1989) (“The bill . . . establishes a statutory framework governing the identification, processing, rights, and responsibilities of aliens who,
because of generalized violence, natural disasters, or other unsettled conditions in their home
country, should be allowed to remain temporarily in the United States.” (emphasis added)).
457. 136 CONG. REC. S17,106-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(“A clear policy is established for granting temporary safe haven to foreign nationals unable
to return safely to their native countries because of . . . upheaval.” (emphasis added)).
458. See supra Part I.B (discussing the modern situation involving MS-13 and M-18 in the
Northern Triangle).
459. See March 2015 Honduras Travel Warning, supra note 444; June 2015 El Salvador
Travel Warning, supra note 442.
460. See March 2015 Honduras Travel Warning, supra note 444 (“The vast majority of
serious crimes in Honduras . . . are never solved.”); June 2015 El Salvador Travel Warning,
supra note 442 (“A majority of serious crimes are never solved.”). With respect to Guatemala,
the State Department has said, “[h]igh murder rates identify Guatemala as one of the most
dangerous countries in the Western Hemisphere. . . . [L]ocal officials find it difficult to cope
with the caseload and many homicides never result in a prosecution or conviction.” Guatemala Country Information, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/country/guatemala.html.
461. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
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the situation in the Northern Triangle seems to be as harrowing as
conditions in other countries previously designated for TPS. To be
sure, every country is unique, and it is difficult to compare humanitarian crises across the globe. But with more than 140,000 people
killed in the Northern Triangle over the past decade,462 and the
violence continuing, the situation in the region appears to be as
dire as the current conditions in Yemen463 or the post-earthquake
conditions in El Salvador in 2001464—both of which prompted TPS
designations.465 At the very least, recent reporting on the Northern
Triangle suggests that conditions in the region are as violent as they
were in the early 1990s,466 when El Salvador was first designated for
TPS because of civil war.467 In short, designating the Northern Triangle countries for TPS would be appropriate.
Finally, designating El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for
TPS would also be consistent with the purpose of TPS. Congress
developed the TPS framework in order to give the executive branch
the authority to temporarily protect specific groups of people—
those who have fled humanitarian crises in their home countries
and now face the legal crisis of removal from the United States.468
Indeed, a House of Representatives report noted that the point of
TPS was to protect those individuals who fell into “this gap in existing law.”469 In other words, as the Congressional Research Service
put it, “Temporary Protected Status . . . is the statutory embodiment
of safe haven for those . . . who may not meet the legal definition of

462. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
463. Designation of the Republic of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status Program, 80
Fed. Reg. 53,319 (Sept. 3, 2015). When designating Yemen for TPS due to “an ongoing
armed conflict,” the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security noted, among other
things, that “as of July 2015, there have been approximately 3,700 registered deaths and over
18,000 registered injuries attributed to the conflict.” Id. at 53,320.
464. Designation of El Salvador Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 66 Fed.
Reg. 14,214 (March 9, 2001). These earthquakes “resulted in at least 1,100 deaths, 7,859
injuries, and over 2,500 missing.” Id.
465. See supra notes 463–64.
466. See El Salvador Violence Up to Civil War-Era Levels, BBC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34124090; see also infra note 445 and accompanying
text.
467. See LISA SEGHETTI, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED
STATUS: CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ISSUES 3 (2015) (discussing this designation).
468. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,106-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Deconcini); H.R. REP. NO. 101-245, at 8–9 (1989).
469. H.R. REP. NO. 101-245, at 9 (1989); see also id. at 8–12 (discussing the need for the
TPS framework and quoting testimony from an Assistant Secretary of State).
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refugee but are nonetheless fleeing—or reluctant to return to—
potentially dangerous situations.”470
This, of course, is the exact situation that so many young people
from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras face here in the
United States. As this Article has discussed, many of the migrants
who have recently arrived at the southern border are fleeing a genuine humanitarian crisis in the Northern Triangle,471 and they now
face hurdles that will likely prevent them from obtaining relief from
removal.472 Accordingly, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should exercise his delegated power and issue new
TPS designations for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.473
Ultimately, this is a modest solution. Individuals who are granted
TPS are not removable from the United States while the designation remains in place.474 But these individuals have no lasting
immigration status.475 Indeed, those “who receive TPS are not on an
immigration track that leads to permanent residence or citizenship.”476 Moreover, “even if an individual has been granted TPS, the
Government can still move forward with removal proceedings and
even secure a removal order; the Government just cannot execute
that order until the individual’s TPS expires.”477 In other words,
designating El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for TPS would
simply constitute an administrative stopgap, preventing the U.S.
government from deporting individuals back to the Northern Triangle until the horrific gang violence subsides. Given the
unprecedented humanitarian crisis engulfing the region, this is the
right solution.

470. SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 467, at 2; see also Hershberg & Rathod, supra note 35
(recognizing that TPS “will protect migrants who cannot satisfy the eligibility requirements
for asylum”).
471. See supra Part I.
472. See supra Part II.
473. Professors Hershberg and Rathod also persuasively argue that “[s]ince TPS is explicitly authorized by Congress, a conferral is likely to dull some of the [recent] criticism around
unfettered executive authority.” Hershberg & Rathod, supra note 35.
474. See supra note 417 and accompanying text. Eligible individuals could also obtain authorization to work in the United States and permission to travel abroad without losing his or
her status. See supra notes 418–420 and accompanying text.
475. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(1) (“During a period in which an alien is granted temporary
protected status . . . the alien shall not be considered to be permanently residing in the
United States under color of law.”).
476. SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 467, at 2.
477. Iraheta v. Holder, 503 F. App’x 362, 365 (6th Cir. 2012).
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CONCLUSION
This Article examined the intersecting humanitarian and legal
crises facing so many unaccompanied children from the Northern
Triangle. The Article began by acknowledging that these migrants
are fleeing a genuine humanitarian crisis—a region overrun by violent gangs that regularly target young people for recruitment.
Unfortunately, as this Article also explained, these children are now
facing a legal crisis here in the United States. Indeed, the children
must confront numerous procedural and substantive hurdles in trying to avoid deportation. As a result, many of the children are at
serious risk of being deported and subsequently killed—the same
tragic fate suffered by young Benito Zaldı́var. Given this reality, the
Obama administration should exercise its congressionally delegated power and issue new TPS designations for El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. This administrative stopgap would save
an untold number of lives by temporarily preventing the U.S. government from deporting migrants back to the Northern Triangle
until the violence subsides.

